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ABSTRACT
In 2007, Rick Sharga, vice president of marketing at RealtyTrac, stated that with
more stringent lending and underwriting standards, “we will likely see a significant
foreclosure decrease”1 within the next three years. However, a sustained and
considerable decrease in foreclosures has yet to occur. In fact, the real estate market
downfall and resulting mortgage and housing crisis have proven to be wider, deeper, and
more serious than first anticipated. Since 2007, millions of homeowners faced, and
continue to face, foreclosure proceedings.2 To provide protections for homeowners,
federal and state actors have attempted regulatory and legislative solutions to stem the
foreclosure crisis. The attempted regulatory and legislative responses, such as
foreclosure moratoria, have failed to pull the real estate housing market out of crisis and
provide meaningful relief to homeowners facing foreclosure.3 Many factors contribute to
this failure, but namely, lack of uniform rules and policies among the relevant federal
and state agencies for lenders, homeowners, and servicers. This Article contends that,
with the rate of foreclosures predicted to steadily continue into 2015,4 the need for
standardized intervention remains imperative to sustain the goal of home ownership,
safeguard consumers, guide lenders and servicers, and stabilize the real estate market.
INTRODUCTION
I. BACKGROUND
II. THE TIES THAT BIND: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REAL ESTATE MARKET AND
NATIONAL ECONOMY
III. STATE FORECLOSURE PROCESSES
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*
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1
Maya Rooney, The Forecast of Foreclosure, BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 26, 2007, 12:00 AM),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/Mar2007/db2007/db20070326_901985.htm#fadeto
black. RealtyTrac describes itself as the “most trusted source of foreclosure information.” REALTYTRAC,
http://www.realtytrac.com/home/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
2
See infra Part II.
3
See infra Part V.
4
Mike Colpitts, Housing Foreclosure Crisis Five More Years, HOUSINGPREDICTOR (June 9, 2011),
http://www.housingpredictor.com/2011/foreclosure-crisis-forecast.html.
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VI. CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The turbulent mortgage and housing crisis has handicapped the national economy
for nearly five years.5 With an estimated 2.5 million foreclosures completed from 2007 to
2009 and another estimated 5.7 million homeowners in imminent risk of foreclosure,6
5

Benjamin S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Monetary Policy and the Housing
Bubble, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (Jan. 3, 2010) (dating the
start of the current financial crisis to August 2007).
6
Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Wen Li & Keith S. Ernst, Foreclosures by Race and Ethnicity: The
Demographics of a Crisis, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 1, 7 (June 18, 2010),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-andethnicity.pdf (acknowledging the Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey that finds
that the percentage of mortgages in the foreclosure process is at 4.63%, which is a historical high since
1979). The first quarter of 2011 still showed a high incidence of foreclosure. During this time, the ten states
with the highest numbers of foreclosure were: 1) Nevada, 1 in 35 households were in foreclosure; 2)
Arizona, 1 in 60 households were in foreclosure; 3) California, 1 in 80 households were in foreclosure; 4)
Utah, 1 in 98 households were in foreclosure; 5) Idaho, 1 in 106 households were in foreclosure; 6)
Georgia, 1 in 108 households were in foreclosure; 7) Michigan, 1 in 121 households were in foreclosure; 8)
Florida, 1 in 152 households were in foreclosure; 9) Colorado, 1 in 157 households were in foreclosure; and
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debtors and consumer advocacy groups have demanded comprehensive reformation of
both mortgage and foreclosure laws. Among the chief complaints made by consumer
advocacy groups were lenders’ failure to communicate before and during foreclosure
proceedings and debtors’ inability to work toward loan modification without the
continued threat of foreclosure.7 Additionally, many debtors were victims of mortgagee
robo-signing.8 Consequently, thousands of Americans experienced severely tainted and
possibly wrongful mortgage foreclosure processes. Moreover, even those consumers who
have not yet entered the housing market are affected by being sidelined until this crisis is
settled. The implications of the broader foreclosure crisis are even more far-reaching; the
crisis additionally affects, for example, neighbors of the foreclosed debtors,
homebuilders, and municipalities.9
The form and type of reformation utilized are vitally important. Reformers must be
vigilant to create consistent and uniform standards, not piecemeal or conflicting
standards. Non-uniform standards could lead to unpredictable foreclosure rules for
lenders or servicers.10 Also, having unclear rules or too many agencies involved in the
reformation process will confuse or overburden lenders or servicers and inhibit
consumers’ ability to navigate through the process to receive much needed help.
Similarly, because the real estate market and national economy are inextricably
tied, policing the foreclosure process as a reaction to the foreclosure crisis without
considerable thought and study may lead to unforeseen ramifications for the national
economy. Therefore, when promulgating new laws that completely bar a lender’s ability
10) Illinois, 1 in 160 households were in foreclosure. Melinda Fulmer, Foreclosure Rates: 20 Cities with
Highest Filings and State-by-State Rankings, MSN REAL ESTATE,
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=28364347 (last visited June 23, 2011). Though
ranked third overall, cities in California dominate in the top ten cities with the most foreclosures list for the
first quarter of 2011. The top ten foreclosure cities are: 1) Las Vegas-Paradise, Nevada (26,275 foreclosure
filings, 1 in 31 households); 2) Modesto, California (3809 foreclosure filings, 1 in 46 households); 3)
Stockton, California (4821 foreclosure filings, 1 in 47 households); 4) Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, Arizona
(36,422 foreclosure filings, 1 in 48 households); 5) Vallejo-Fairfield, California (3111 foreclosure filings, 1
in 48 households); 6) Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, California (29,859 foreclosure filings, 1 in 49
households); 7) Merced, California (1605 foreclosure filings, 1 in 52 households); 8) Reno-Sparks, Nevada
(3369 foreclosure filings, 1 in 54 households); 9) Bakersfield, California (4729 foreclosure filings, 1 in 58
households); and 10) Fresno (4729 foreclosure filings, 1 in 62 households). Id.
7
Alejandro Lazo & E. Scott Reckard, Bank Agreements Address Foreclosure Complaints, WICHITA EAGLE,
Apr. 14, 2011, http://www.kansas.com/2011/04/14/1807247/bank-agreements-address-foreclosure.html.
8
Robo-signing, in short, involves questionable mortgage paperwork or affidavits signed by mortgagees or
their agents. In a typical foreclosure action, a mortgagee is required to file an affidavit that affirms that it
has the right to foreclose and verifies the information alleged in the foreclosure paperwork. Due to being
overwhelmed by the number of foreclosures or out of sheer laziness, many mortgagees took shortcuts.
Thus, tens of thousands of mortgage documents contain suspect signatures, improper notarizations or were
signed without a review of the actual paperwork. Many top lending institutions were guilty of robo-signing.
They include Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co., and Wells Fargo & Co. Pallavi Gogoi,
Robo-Signed Mortgage Documents Date Back to Late 1990s, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 1, 2011,
http://articles.boston.com/2011-09-01/news/30102377_1_robo-signing-mortgage-paperwork-banks-andother-mortgage.
9
See infra Part III.
10
Jeff Jeffrey, Washington Firms Prepare for Boom in Foreclosure Work, BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGALTIMES
(Oct. 19, 2010, 4:03 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010 /10/washington-firms-prepare-for-boomin-foreclosure-work-.html.
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to foreclose, or delay the foreclosure process, courts and legislatures must not only
cautiously consider the specific foreclosure and debtor but also the potential effect on the
nation’s economy and other arenas. For example, mortgagors, desperate to save their
homes, could flood bankruptcy courts.11
To counterbalance the escalation of foreclosure filings, states began transforming
their foreclosure procedures when filings escalated.12 Courts and state legislatures set
forth (or are in the process of setting forth) procedures that dramatically restrict a lender’s
right to foreclose on its security. These new procedures either: a) require consumer
counseling;13 b) require lenders to jump through procedural hoops as a prerequisite to
foreclose;14 c) cause substantial delays in the foreclosure process;15 d) completely bar a
lender from foreclosing for a period of time (or entirely);16 or e) modify redemption
periods.17 These new policies signify to lenders that the “glory days” of quick and
relatively easy foreclosure are most likely over.18
Arguably, these new procedures are appropriate in light of the epic number of
foreclosures and the potential (and documented) misdeeds by lenders during the preforeclosure and foreclosure stages. For instance, in the age of robo-signing, new
foreclosure procedures may be justified to prevent debtor abuse or bullying. Typically,
debtors faced the foreclosure process without the requisite knowledge and were
unassisted by legal counsel.19 Moreover, because the likely victims of foreclosure are
11

Katherine Porter, Consumer Debtor Class Actions: One More Windmill, or the Ultimate Remedy for the
Subprime Mess?, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (Apr. 3, 2008) (stating that seeking bankruptcy
might afford debtors “one last chance to save their homes”).
12
Starting in 2007, the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, which is comprised of states’
attorneys general and bank regulators, formed and began gathering data on thirteen of the twenty largest
subprime mortgage servicers during the last quarter of 2007. The attorneys general from Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and
Washington are a part of the multi-state coalition. Bank regulators from New York, North Carolina, and
Maryland and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors also participate in the coalition. Analysis of
Subprime Mortgage Servicing Performance, Data Report No. 1, STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION
WORKING GROUP 3 (Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Home/StateForeclosurePreventionWorkGroupDataReport.p
df.
13
Indiana lawmakers introduced H.B. 1753, which became Public Law 176 (May 4, 2007). This law
authorized the Indiana Housing and Community Development Authority to create a free mortgage
foreclosure counseling and education to homeowners who are in or near default of their mortgages. IND.
CODE § 5-20-6 (2007).
14
In Maine, L.D. 1617, Public Law 391 (2007), repealed the strict foreclosure laws.
15
S.B. 651, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011).
16
H.B. 331, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2011).
17
See, e.g., S.P. 278, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2009) (died in committee) (proposing an extension of the
mortgagor redemption period to one year for foreclosures initiated on or after October 1, 2009 instead of
ninety days).
18
Arguably, these days had passed by what is hopefully the apex of the foreclosure in 2009. The average
time frame to transition a property through foreclosure increased from an average of 250 days in the
beginning of 2008 to 450 days by the end of 2010. FED. RESERVE BD., INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF
FORECLOSURE POLICIES & PRACTICES 6 (2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/interagency/interagency.htm.
19
Melanca Clark & Maggie Barron, Foreclosures: A Crisis in Legal Representation, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, 7–8 (2009), http://brennan.3cdn.net/a5bf8a685cd085cd0885f72_s8m6bevkx.pdf.
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mortgagors who had subprime or high cost adjustable rate mortgages,20 foreclosing a
mortgagee’s ability to foreclose prevents revictimization. Thus, lenders would be
required to strictly adhere to the new procedures before a debtor loses his or her most
prized and likely most valuable asset. Additionally, any new measures may be beneficial
to lessen the burden on limited court resources due to heightened levels of unresolved
foreclosure actions.21
State legislatures and courts are not the only actors generating loss mitigation
strategies in the wake of the mortgage and foreclosure crisis. Other actors in reforming
the foreclosure and lending processes include: the federal government, lenders, mortgage
servicers, special mortgage groups, consumer advocacy groups, and borrowers.
The common thread among all recent mortgage and foreclosure reform efforts is
the desire to stop the massive bleeding of the self-inflicted wounds caused by
irresponsible borrowing, careless underwriting processes, reckless or discriminatory
lending practices, deceptive appraisal of home values, broker misconduct, and sloppy
foreclosure procedures.22 However, the sheer number of parties involved in drafting
reform legislation or regulation may prove challenging. As the old idiom goes, “too many
cooks spoil the broth.”23 That is, with so many parties with conflicting interests all trying
to create mortgage and foreclosure reform, it is likely that any legislation will be
contradictory or puzzling, with inconsistent rules. Any such rules would undermine the
reformers’ intended purpose, providing no guidance to lenders/servicers or aid to
desperate homeowners.
It is imperative that reformers strike a tender balance by creating stringent, but fair,
solutions that address and protect homeowners’ needs. For example, where a debtor is
either disinterested in saving his or her home from foreclosure, or is financially unable to
do so (even if the mortgage is modified), any foreclosure bar will serve as a burden on the
20

Analysis of Subprime Mortgage Servicing Performance, STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING
GRP., 1–2 (2008), available at illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2008_09/SFPWGReport3.pdf
(reporting that a “significant percentage of subprime adjustable rate loans are delinquent before they
experience payment shock from their first adjustment, reflecting weak underwriting or fraud in the
origination of the loan.”); Redefault Rates Improve for Recent Loan Modifications, STATE FORECLOSURE
PREVENTION WORKING GRP. (2010), available at
http://www.csbs.org/regulartotyr/Documents/SFPWG/DataReportAug2010.pdf.
21
See, e.g., Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Co. v. Frazier, No. 2011-05-02-01 (C.P. Cnty. of Charleston,
N.C. Aug. 15, 2011) (order regarding mortgage foreclosure actions).
22
See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, US Sues Deutsche Bank Over Mortgage Approvals, L.A. TIMES (May 3,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/03/business/la-fi-deutsche-bank-20110504 (reporting that the
federal government recently filed suit against Deutsche Bank due to its reckless approval of approximately
39,000 mortgages for government insurance, costing the Fair Housing Administration $386 million in bad
mortgage claims). In the lawsuit, the government alleges that the loans were approved without any regard
to whether the borrowers could pay the monthly payments. The government is seeking three times the
amount it paid in bad mortgage claims plus punitive damages. Id.
23
FRANK LESLIE, FRANK LESLIE’S PLEASANT HOURS 395 (New York, Frank Leslie’s Publishing House
1878). Currently, there are seven federal agencies and multiple state agencies that oversee banking
regulations and consumer protection. The seven federal agencies are: 1) Department of Housing and Urban
Development; 2) Federal Reserve; 3) Office of Thrift Supervision; 4) Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation; 5) Federal Trade Commission; 6) Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; and 7) National
Credit Union Administration. See generally 12 U.S.C.A. § 4545 (2011); 12 U.S.C.A. § 248 (2011); 12
U.S.C.A. § 1 (2011); 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a (2011); 12 U.S.C.A. § 92a (2011); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1752a (2011).
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lender. Similarly, if a debtor is clearly and wantonly in default, then a lender should be
able to foreclose without any impediments.24 In both situations, delaying a foreclosure
action produces only heavy burdens on a lender with no positive effects on a debtor.
With foreclosures not expected to significantly decrease in the near future, both
lenders and borrowers are in serious need for changes with lending and foreclosure
processes and procedures.25 These reforms should have in mind the goals of sustaining
homeownership, or the “American Dream,” and maintaining the integrity of the mortgage
process. The complexity of the mortgage and housing crisis requires a multifaceted and
multi-partied review. However, at the same time, the governing system needs
modification, modernization, and simplification.
Part II of this Article outlines the history of state and federal legislative and
regulatory reform efforts. Part III examines the interrelationship between the real estate
market and national economy on the whole. Because it is imperative to understand the
deterioration of the real estate market, Part IV reviews the foreclosure processes available
in most jurisdictions and discusses the shortcomings revealed by the financial downturn.
The current and forecasted changes to these foreclosure and lending processes are
discussed in Part V. Part VI concludes by arguing that successful transformation of the
lending and foreclosure practices and procedures is difficult when there are too many
parties involved in the process. Reform is possible if lenders and consumers take
affirmative steps to mitigate losses by: 1) educating the public on credit, types of credit,
and foreclosure before any consumer credit transaction for the purchase of a primary
residence is consummated; 2) requiring lenders and their underwriters to offer the
appropriate loan products to borrowers based on a borrower’s current and provable
financial status; 3) streamlining and standardizing banking and servicing regulations; and
4) modernizing foreclosure procedures. Further, any revisions should include steep
penalties for noncompliance in order to establish lender accountability, which will
ultimately give rise to a sustainable and stable housing market. Though many have
speculated, the length of the yawn of this crisis is very uncertain. However, changes are
24

Many borrowers are choosing to “strategically default” when the property values have plummeted to
levels far less than unpaid mortgage balances. See Brad Tuttle, Strategic Mortgage Default: The
Irresponsible, Amoral, but Best Strategy?, TIME MONEYLAND (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://moneyland.time.com/2010/01/11/strategic-mortgage-default-the-irresponsible-amoral-but-beststrategy/.
25
It should be noted that not all economists agree as to when the real estate market will recover. See Better,
but Still Not Good Enough, FREDDIE MAC, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (May
2011), www.freddiemac.com/news/finance/docs/May_2011_public_outlook.pdf (forecasting that the real
estate market will ultimately bottom out by Winter 2012); Vivien Lou Chen & Joshua Zumbrun, Fed’s
Yellen Says U.S. Housing Market Will Undergo a “Drawn-Out” Recovery, BLOOMBERG.COM (June 9,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-09/fed-s-yellen-says-u-s-housing-market-to-have-longdrawn-out-recovery.html (quoting Federal Reserve Vice Chairperson Janet Yellen that once solutions for
the housing crisis have been discovered, “recovery in the housing market will likely be a long, drawn-out
process.”); Colpitts, supra note 4; Gary Lucido, Housing Market Not Likely to Recover Fast, CHICAGO
REAL ESTATE (June 23, 2010), http://www.chicagonow.com/blogs/chicago-real-estate-gettingreal/2010/06/no-big-recovery-for-housing-market.html; Palash R. Ghosh, Housing Market May Not
Normalize for Another Five Years, INT’L BUS.TIMES (Aug. 24, 2010),
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/45867/20100824/housing-recession.htm; William Alden, Home Prices
Could Drop for the Next Three Years: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/15/home-prices-could-drop_n_717660.html.
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underway to transform lending and foreclosure practices that will, hopefully, protect
consumers from predatory or discriminatory lending practices, sustain and create new
homeownership opportunities, adequately guide lenders or servicers, and stabilize the real
estate market.
I. BACKGROUND
Legislators, responding to distressed homeowners’ cries and witnessing the
devastating impact on their states’ economies, scrambled to introduce and enact
legislation to halt the economic downward spiral. From January 2007 to June 2011,
lawmakers across the country progressively introduced and enacted foreclosure reform
legislation. In 2007, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia presented foreclosure
legislation; nineteen states and the District of Columbia enacted legislation.26 Legislators
became more active in 2008. Thirty jurisdictions plus the District of Columbia generated
foreclosure legislation.27 In 2009, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico considered legislation related to foreclosures; thirty-three jurisdictions and Puerto
Rico enacted legislation.28 Lawmakers in forty states and the District of Columbia
introduced foreclosure legislation in 2010.29 That same year, twenty-six jurisdictions and
the District of Columbia enacted foreclosure legislation.30 Every year, it appears that
states become more aggressive in pursuing foreclosure reform. From January to June
2011, state legislators in forty-five jurisdictions have proposed foreclosure legislation.31
These reformation measures respond to delinquent debtors and consumer advocacy
groups’ demands for mortgage foreclosure reform in light of extremely flawed
foreclosure procedures. These groups argue that the current procedures are fundamentally
unfair to defaulting debtors, riddled with inaccuracies and lack of oversight.32 As such,
they have demanded an overhaul of foreclosure processes.33
The mortgage and housing meltdown has highlighted other issues such as flawed
lending processes. For instance, certain types of loan products, such as adjustable rate
26

Foreclosure 2007 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org?tabid=12513
(last updated Jan. 21, 2009).
27
Foreclosure 2008 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org?tabid=12510
(last updated Jan. 21, 2009).
28
Foreclosure 2009 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org?tabid=12513
(last updated Jan. 5, 2010).
29
Foreclosure 2010 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org?tabid=12513
(last updated Jan. 25, 2011).
30
Id.
31
Foreclosures 2011 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/banking/foreclosures-2011-legislation.aspx (last updated Sept. 13, 2011) (stating that “lawmakers
in [forty-five] jurisdictions and the District of Columbia have introduced legislation regarding foreclosure”
in 2011 and that twenty-two “states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have enacted legislation or
adopted resolutions” as of June 29, 2011).
32
The Need for National Mortgage Servicing Standards: Hearings Before S. Subcomm. on Housing,
Transportation and Community Development of the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (May 12, 2011), available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mortgage_servicing/testimony-thompson-mortgageservicing-standards.pdf (written testimony of Diane E. Thompson) [hereinafter Testimony of Thompson].
33
Lazo & Reckard, supra note 7.
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mortgages, have proven problematic. Though the foreclosure process has touched the
prime market, its effect on the subprime market is quite lopsided.34 Numerous borrowers
who purchased their homes with subprime adjustable rate mortgages are unable to repay
their loans.35 Accordingly, these borrowers must decide whether they should refinance,
sell, or walk away from their homes.36 This has been called a “kind of devil’s
dilemma.”37
Many of the reformers seem to ignore the fact that lenders are in the lending
business. That is, lenders lend money to make profits over the life of a loan or upon its
sale—it is the lifeblood of their business. Like any other business, it has a balance sheet
that must remain “in the black” to survive and thrive. One way it remains so is by the
repayment of debts with interest. However, if a debtor defaults by not repaying the debt
or otherwise, then a lender heavily relies on its ability to foreclose on the security given
for the debt.38 The security given is typically the property for which the loan was used to
purchase, such as a home, in residential cases.39 Thus, if lenders are unable to foreclose
on their debts, then they may choose to further tighten credit terms or forgo lending in a
particular area entirely.
If foreclosure reform efforts are too stringent, lenders’ decisions to tighten credit
criteria could lead to the continued decline of housing values.40 If housing prices remain
low, then it could potentially prolong the real estate market downturn.41 The real estate
market becomes cyclical and self-sustaining.42 If lenders tighten their lending
prerequisites or require 20% down payments, then fewer consumers would qualify.43
Foreclosures further increase the supply of vacant homes, which lowers home prices and
hinders new construction.44 Lower home prices may result in home equity losses,
strategic defaults, and foreclosure filings.45 Therefore, and debatably, the longer the real
estate market slump persists, the longer the national financial condition remains
unstable.46 To steady the real estate market, and, consequently, the national economy,
34

Analysis of Subprime Mortgage Servicing Performance, supra note 12, at 1–2.
Id.
36
See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
37
Id.
38
GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 2.1 (5th ed. 2007) (stating that it is
“axiomatic that a mortgage is security for the performance of an act, that is the very nature of a mortgage”).
39
Id. at § 1.1.
40
See Rob Garver, Rule That Could Kill Housing Market, MSN MONEY (Oct. 1, 2011),
http://money.msn.com/home-loans/rule-that-could-kill-housing-market-fiscaltimes.aspx (quoting Bruce
Schultz, vice president at Spirit Bank in Bristow, Oklahoma, “If the stated policy goal here is to have a
default rate of 1% or less on qualifying residential mortgages, I am sure they will get to that goal. But you
could also get to a default of zero by making no loans.”).
41
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE OUTLOOK FOR HOUSING STARTS 2009–2012 16 (2008), available at
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/98xx/doc9885/11-17-housingstarts.pdf (recognizing that
high unemployment, tightened credit standards, or declines in home prices are factors that could cause a
cyclical downturn market).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 19.
45
Tuttle, supra note 24.
46
The argument is as follows. If the real estate market persists to have a flood of available inventory, then
housing prices will continue to fall. Consequently, lower housing prices will lead to more foreclosures. If
35
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drastic steps must be taken to halt the foreclosure crisis.47
II. THE TIES THAT BIND: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REAL ESTATE MARKET AND
NATIONAL ECONOMY
The classic explanation of financial crises, going back hundreds of years, is that
they are caused by excesses—frequent monetary excesses—that lead to a boom and an
inevitable bust. In the recent crisis we had a housing boom and bust, which in turn led to
financial turmoil in the United States and other countries.48
The tie between the real estate market and the overall national economy is both
undeniable and complex. According to Chairman Benjamin Bernanke of the Federal
Reserve, “[d]eclining house prices, delinquencies and foreclosures, and strains in
mortgage markets are now symptoms as well as causes of our general financial and
economic difficulties. These interlinkages imply that policies aimed at improving broad
financial and economic conditions and policies focused specifically on housing may be
mutually reinforcing.”49 As the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
reported in its Fiscal Year 2010–2015 Strategic Plan, “[t]he state of the housing market
plays a big role in . . . the strength of our national economy.”50 Hence, if the housing
market is feeble, then the national economy will be correspondingly feeble.
Without question, the high foreclosure rates have adversely affected the broader
economy at large.51 The cause of the current real estate market meltdown has been
debated. Many pundits believe that the demise of the real estate market is due to lenders
making risky subprime mortgages.52 Undoubtedly, the increase in subprime mortgages
played a role in the real estate market upheaval, along with a decline in home prices, and
a higher incidence of predatory lending and lax loan underwriting standards.53
The deterioration of the housing market has a rippling effect on several segments of
the economy. Together, these segments, in turn, have a tangible and devastating effect on
the national economy. For instance, as a result of the housing market downfall, the
foreclosures continue at its current pace or increase, then the overall economic market will remain unstable,
prolonging the national recession. See EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34653,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM 8 (2008).
47
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has listed stemming the foreclosure crisis as
its number one sub-goal in its overall goal of strengthening the housing market. HUD STRATEGIC PLAN—
FY 2010–2015 (2010), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_4441.pdf.
48
JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED,
PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1 (2009).
49
Benjamin S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Housing, Mortgage
Markets, and Foreclosures (Dec. 4, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081204a.htm.
50
HUD STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 47.
51
Bernanke, supra note 49.
52
Clyde Ashley & Krystal Wilson, The Credit Crunch and the Impact on the U.S. Economy and Global
Markets: How Damaging Will It Be?, 16 PROC. OF AM. SOC’Y OF BUS. & BEHAV. SCI. 1 (2009), available at
http://www.asbbs.org/files/2009/PDF/A/AshleyC2.pdf (suggesting that when the ill-perceived stability of
the mortgage-backed security market began to falter in 2006, the fallout was declining home process and
defaulting mortgagors, which together caused the real estate market meltdown).
53
HUD STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 47.
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housing market is flooded with inventory in a number of states.54 This affects the new
homebuilders market.55 New homebuilders must take drastic steps to get rid of their
inventory because of the competition caused by the influx of foreclosed homes. Due to
high level of inventory, homebuilders go to extremes to move their new home inventory
and reduce the number of new homes they build.56 One source estimates that the building
industry will reduce its output by one-half.57 Such reductions will cause a loss of millions
of jobs, which would consequently affect the national economy.58
Also, due to high levels of defaults, lenders are increasingly more reluctant to lend
and are holding on tight to their resources.59 Not only are lenders extremely wary in
extending mortgages, but they are also overly cautious in all other types of lending,60
such as extending small business loans or other consumer loans.61 Additionally, lenders
are reducing the number of private education loans they offer.62 One of the main reasons
is that these debts are unsecured.63 Students unable to qualify for private education loans
may be required to stay in school longer, causing them to increase their federal education
loans and over debt loads. Accordingly, then, there will be a large number of future
homebuyers with exorbitant education loans who will be unable to qualify for lower cost
home loans.64 Consequently, a segment of the population is shut out of the housing
54

On May 26, 2011, the Associated Press reported that an estimated “872,000 homes that have been
repossessed by lenders, but have yet to be sold.” RealtyTrac estimates that it will take three years to clear
the inventory of the 1.9 million properties already in some stage of foreclosure. Report: Sales of Foreclosed
Homes Fell in 1Q, AARP (May 26, 2011), http://www.aarp.org/home-garden/housing/news-052011/report_sales_of_foreclosed_homes_fell_in_1q.html.
55
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 41.
56
David Streitfeld, Bad Times Linger in Home Building as Economy Rises, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/business/economy/23housing.html (illustrating that homebuilders
drastically cut home prices or resort to gimmicks such as giving away credit towards new cars).
57
Ashley & Wilson, supra note 52.
58
Id.
59
Tara Seigel Bernard, Need a Mortgage? Don’t Get Pregnant, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/20/your-money/mortgages/20mortgage.html (reporting that strict lending
guidelines resulting from the mortgage crisis permit lenders to reject loans when there is any temporary
suspension of income, even if the suspension is due to maternity or paternity leave).
60
Reportedly, lending fell 40% from $2.65 trillion in 2007 to $1.61 trillion in 2008. See Dennis Cuevas,
Federal Response to the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis: The Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan,
NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., http://www.naag.org/federal-response-to-the-foreclosure-crisis-thehomeowner-affordability-and-stability-plan.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
61
Ashley & Wilson, supra note 52 (stating that “[t]he crisis has had a major impact on the economy at
large. Rather than lending money for business growth and consumer spending, it forced lenders to hoard
cash or invest in stable assets.”); see also Small Business Lending: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Financial Services and H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Elizabeth A. Duke,
Member, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/duke20100226a.htm (claiming that large commercial
bank loans to small businesses dropped 2%, or $14 billion, from June 30, 2008 to June 30, 2009); David
Goldman, Banks Still Reluctant to Lend, CNN MONEY (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/17/news/economy/fed_senior_loan_officer_survey/index.htm.
62
Ashley & Wilson, supra note 52.
63
Id.
64
Student loans are included in a potential mortgagor’s debt to income ratio, which, in turn, makes it
difficult for mortgagors to qualify. The higher a mortgagor’s debt is relative to his or her income, the higher
a mortgagor will pay for a loan, if he or she still qualifies. See Erin Peterson, Debt-to-Income Ratio
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market, which may profoundly affect the national economy. Foreclosures increase the
inventory of resale homes on the market.65 Strict lending standards prevent consumers
from purchasing real estate or other products, which keeps the housing market in its
downturn due to flooding of inventory. Likewise, tight lending in other areas, such as
small business loans or educational loans, prolongs unemployment and potentially
inhibits technological innovations.
As Sarah Raskin of the Federal Reserve asserts, “The wave of foreclosures is one
of the factors hindering a rapid recovery in the economy. Traditionally, the housing
sector . . . has played an important role in propelling economic recoveries.”66 Arguably, if
there is resolution of the foreclosure crisis, then recovery of the national economy should
soon follow.
III. STATE FORECLOSURE PROCESSES
Though the primary purpose behind each foreclosure law, i.e., to protect
consumers,67 remains unswerving, foreclosure processes vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. States’ processes fall into one of the following classifications: non-judicial
foreclosure, judicial foreclosure, or mixed judicial/non-judicial foreclosure
jurisdictions.68 The rationales for selecting one of the classifications also differ from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. As one author previously noted, states might be more lenderor more debtor-centric.69 The more debtor-friendly states tend to be judicial foreclosure
or mixed jurisdictions. The lender-friendly states tend to be non-judicial foreclosure
jurisdictions. Consequently, the highest rates of foreclosure are in non-judicial
foreclosure states.70
A. Judicial Foreclosures
Judicial foreclosure is believed to be the dominant method of foreclosure in
approximately forty percent of all jurisdictions.71 It requires a lender to file a court action
Important as Credit Score, BANKRATE.COM (Jan. 24, 2007),
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20070116_debt_income_ratio_a2.asp.
65
Tami Luhby, How to Rescue the Housing Market: Foreclosures!, CNN MONEY (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/31/real_estate/housing_market _foreclosures/index.htm.
66
Sarah Bloom Raskin, Member, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Creating and
Implementing an Enforcement Response to the Foreclosure Crisis, Speech at the Am. Assoc. of Law
Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/raskin20120107a.htm.
67
Foreclosure Laws, FORECLOSURERADAR, http://www.foreclosureradar.com/foreclosureguides/foreclosures-101/foreclosure-laws (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
68
Yianni D. Lagos, Fixing a Broken System: Reconciling State Foreclosure Law with Economic Realities,
7 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 84, 103 (2011) (noting that the jurisdictions are characterized as follows: twentynine are non-judicial foreclosure states, eleven are judicial foreclosure states, nine are mixed judicial/nonjudicial foreclosure states, and one permits strict foreclosure).
69
Id. at 103.
70
Fulmer, supra note 6.
71
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 38, at § 7.11. Judicial foreclosure is the predominant foreclosure
method in Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont,
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to initiate a foreclosure proceeding.72 It is universally permitted in all jurisdictions either
by statute or in equity.73 Courts oversee the detail-oriented foreclosure process. Due to
this oversight, the foreclosure process in judicial foreclosure takes more time to
complete.74 In order to foreclose, a lender must take several steps, including a title search
to identify the parties interested in the property, filing of the foreclosure action and lis
pendens, notice of sale and entry of decree for deficiency, among other things.75 Skipping
necessary requirements of judicial foreclosure may result in complication for a creditor or
its assigns.76
B. Power of Sale Foreclosures
Power of sale foreclosures are authorized in a large number of jurisdictions.77 The
non-judicial foreclosure process has very limited, if any, court involvement.78 To institute
a foreclosure action, a lender must simply provide notice to the debtor before the property
is sold in a public forum.79 Typically, this method of foreclosure is less costly, rigorous
and time-consuming.80 As such, lenders, if given a choice, would likely choose this
method of foreclosure.
During the current crisis, there has been an apparent correlation between a
jurisdiction’s type of foreclosing method and its number of foreclosures. There are higher
incidences of foreclosures in non-judicial foreclosure states than in judicial foreclosure
jurisdictions.81 Presumably, this is because of the relative ease, lower cost, and rapid
conclusion of this type of claim.82 The five states with the highest number of foreclosures
in the first quarter of 2011 are Nevada, Arizona, California, Utah, and Idaho.83 All of
these states permit non-judicial foreclosures.84

and Wisconsin. Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. (stating that “even in jurisdictions where power of sale foreclosure is dominant, judicial foreclosure is
required in certain special situations”).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Problems may further delay a foreclosure’s conclusion or cause it to be ineffective as to a particular
party. These include omitting an interested party, failing to provide proper notice to the debtor or interested
party, inadequacy of the sales price, problems with bidding and/or noncompliance with statutes. See
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 38, at §§ 7.11–7.18.
77
Id. at § 7.19 (stating that power of sales are “permitted in 60% of [all] jurisdictions”). Jurisdictions that
permit non-judicial foreclosures are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
78
Id. (acknowledging that non-judicial foreclosures do not require court supervision).
79
The property may be sold by a lender, a sheriff, or an authorized third party. Id.
80
Id.
81
Fulmer, supra note 6.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Four states—California, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah—recognize both judicial and non-judicial
foreclosures, while one state, Idaho, uses non-judicial foreclosure exclusively.
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C. Inadequacies of Modern Foreclosure Process

Irrespective of whether a jurisdiction is a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure
system, the foreclosure process seems to be riddled with systemic flaws. Common
foreclosure errors include: a) a mortgage servicer’s inadvertent misapplication of a
debtor’s mortgage payments;85 b) failure to recognize a debtor’s exemption from
foreclosure under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act;86 c) failure to prove a foreclosing
party’s title to a promissory note;87 d) improper endorsements of mortgage notes;88 e)
backdating paperwork or assignments; f) affidavits without signatures filed or personal
knowledge of its contents;89 g) claiming inflated legal fees associated with foreclosure;90
or h) lost or missing promissory notes.91 There are many reports of courts granting or
enforcing a foreclosure decree or sheriff’s deed that had been improper due to lender
error or an intervening event.92
85

Michelle Conlin, Foreclosure Errors Are Hitting More Innocent Homeowners, USA TODAY (Dec. 13,
2010), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2010-12-11-foreclosure-wrong-people_N.htm;
see, e.g., In re Prince, Bankr. No. 197-11992, 2009 WL 2584769, **3–4 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2009)
(reinstating debtors’ mortgage and awarding compensatory damages in light of servicer’s admitted
misapplication of mortgage payments).
86
War and National Defense Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 501–596 (2011). The U.S. Department of Justice reached a
settlement with Bank of America and Saxon Mortgage (a subsidiary of Morgan Stanley) for at least $22
million in relief for wrongfully foreclosed servicemembers. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice,
Justice Department Settles with Bank of America and Saxon Mortgage for Illegally Foreclosing on
Servicemembers (May 26, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crt-683.html; see, e.g.,
Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas, No. 1:08-CV-361, 2009 WL 701006 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
87
Michael Estrin, Finding Common Foreclosure Errors, BANKRATE.COM (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/mortgage/finding-common-foreclosure-errors.aspx; see, e.g., Foreclosure
by David A. Simpson, No. COA10-361 (N.C. App. 2011) (denying a foreclosure to a mortgagee who failed
to prove ownership of the note).
88
Estrin, supra note 87; see, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49–50 (Mass. 2011).
89
Estrin, supra note 87; see, e.g., Jamie Smith Hopkins, False Signatures Cloud Maryland Foreclosure
Cases, BALTIMORE SUN, (Oct. 12, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-10-12/business/bs-bzforeclosure-attorneys-20101012_1_foreclosure-cases-corrective-affidavits-maryland-and-floridahomeowners; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION &
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF FORECLOSURE POLICIES & PRACTICES 8 (2011),
available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-47a.pdf [hereinafter
FORECLOSURE POLICIES & PRACTICES] (pointing out that examiners discovered that third party law firms
often filed lost note affidavits despite most of the notes being discoverable).
90
Estrin, supra note 87; see, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Dubious Fees Hit Borrowers in Foreclosures, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/business/06mortgage.html?pagewanted=all.
91
Estrin, supra note 87; see, e.g., Country Place Cmty Ass’n, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition
Corp., 51 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. App. 2010). Foreclosure affidavits typically include information related to the
names of the owner of the loan, a debtor’s default status, interest, penalties and fees associated to the debt,
and principal amount due and owing. See supra note 89 (noting that examiners found that many affidavits
were inadequate and were expeditiously signed without personal knowledge of the materials within).
92
See Ann Woolner, Foreclosure Error May Bring Home Break-In by Bank, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-15/foreclosure-error-may-lead-to-break-in-by-bankcommentary-by-ann-woolner.html. The FDIC has proposed that servicers should contribute to a single fund
to compensate wrongfully foreclosed consumers. Mark Huffman, Top Regulator Pushes Settlement for
Foreclosure Errors, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2011/01/top-regulator-pushes-settlement-for-foreclosureerrors.html.
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Depending upon when the borrower discovers the error and whether he or she is
cognizant of his or her rights, a court may remedy these blunders. A debtor may receive
injunctive relief, a voided sale, or damages.93 On the other hand, some debtors do not
contest wrongful foreclosures, either because they are unrepresented by legal counsel or
financially incapable.94
Another concern related to current foreclosure processes is the possibility of dualtrack foreclosure. Dual-track foreclosures occur when lenders/servicers or their agents
continue with foreclosure procedures even though they were in discussion with borrowers
for loan modification or had already approved loan modification.95 This dual-track
foreclosure is deceptive to homeowners. Homeowners may believe that the foreclosure
proceeding is on hold because the lender or servicer agreed to work towards a
modification.96 On the other hand, some servicers deny a mortgagor the opportunity to
modify the loan, to make it more affordable and avoid foreclosure.97
However, more disturbing defects in the foreclosure process have come to light.
With the increased volume of foreclosures, lenders and their foreclosure agents,
determined to move the process along quickly, have been unable to input safeguards to
ensure strict compliance with foreclosure laws and requirements. One of the major
defects that came to light during the crisis is the high level of “robo-signing.”98 Robosigning occurs when a small group of servicer/lender’s employees signs a plethora of
foreclosing affidavits and/or other foreclosure documents on the lender’s behalf; these
documents are then submitted to courts or other agencies in order to aid in the foreclosure
process.99 Due to the high number of foreclosures, the signers attest to having read the
affidavits or debtors files, but did not, in fact, ever read the affidavits or files; in some
instances, the signers might not have been employees of the foreclosing
creditor/servicer.100
93

NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 38, at § 7.22.
Clark & Barron, supra note 19.
95
Alejandro Lazo, Banks are Foreclosing While Homeowners Pursue Loan Modifications, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/14/business/la-fi-dual-tracking-20110415.
96
Id. (noting that lenders view dual track foreclosure as protecting its investment asset, while debtors see it
as a “double cross”).
97
Editorial, Settling Foreclosure Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, at A22.
98
Robostop: The Fuss over Poorly Reviewed Repossessions Exposes Deeper Problems, ECONOMIST (Oct.
14, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17257787 (noting the emergence of “Foreclosuregate” “when
an employee at GMAC Mortgage, part of Ally Financial, admitted to having approved thousands of
repossessions without properly reviewing the documents. The company responded by halting sales of
seized homes in the 23 states where court approval is required to foreclose while it gets to the bottom of its
‘robo-signing’ problem. JP Morgan Chase and several other servicers, which manage loans and distribute
payments to investors in mortgage-backed securities, quickly followed suit. Bank of America has called a
stop in all 50 states.”).
99
DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41491,“ROBO-SIGNING” AND OTHER ALLEGED
DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCESSES 1 (2010).
100
The facts typically attested to by the robo-signers were that original notes were lost or missing and could
not be produced or that the signer actually read the affidavit. Id. at 1 (reporting that a GMAC employee
testified that he signed up to 10,000 foreclosure affidavits a month, or approximately 500 affidavits per
business day); see also Zachary Karabell, The Robosigning Scandal: Foreclosing on Recovery?, TIME
MAG. (Nov. 6, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2026915,00.html; Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), Inc., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010),
94
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Alarmingly, the vast majority of subprime mortgages, which are more prone to
default, were made to minorities.101 There are numerous explanations as to why
minorities disproportionately received subprime mortgages. Historically, minority groups
living in mostly minority neighborhoods had been excluded from mainstream mortgage
lending opportunities.102 The exclusion was due to lender “redlining.” Redlining is a form
of institutional discrimination whereby services like mortgage lending is restricted in
certain areas, such as predominantly minority neighborhoods.103 When HUD attempted to
eradicate redlining by saturating minority neighbors with HUD mortgage alternatives,
many borrowers became prey of savvy and predatory lenders due to lax or nonexistent
oversight and imprudent underwriting criteria.104 Compounding the problems further,
investors often did not express any concerns with underwriting standards because of the
presence of mortgage insurance.105 As a consequence of limited regulation, many brokers
steered their prey, minorities and the elderly, to subprime mortgages, resulting in “reverse
redlining.”106 The steering often occurred even when debtors were qualified for
conventional, prime mortgages.107
Because the rate of mortgage defaults exponentially increases for subprime
mortgages, many racial minorities faced more foreclosures than any other groups,
decimating minority communities.108 One court recently found that a mortgage granted to
a minority buyer to purchase a home in a predominately minority area, “which carries an
interest rate exceeding 9.00%, creates a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory
practice.”109 Though a large number of subprime mortgages fell into default and
foreclosure more regularly during the early days of the market meltdown, there seems to
be an escalation in the number of prime and FHA mortgage defaults and foreclosures in
more recent years.110 Because of these and other shortfalls, the United States is on the
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/mortgage_electronic_registration_systems_inc/ind
ex.html?scp=2&sq=robo-signers&st=cse.
101
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN; INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
SUBPRIME LENDING (Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://archives.hud.gov/reports/subprime/subprime.cfm.
102
NAT’L COMM. ON FAIR HOUSING & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING 31 (Dec.
2008), available at http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/fairhousing/.
103
Redlining, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/redlining.asp#axzz1akry4jk3 (last
visited Oct. 9, 2011).
104
NAT’L COMM. ON FAIR HOUSING & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 102, at 32.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 33 (referencing Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy:
As Housing Boomed Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader Market, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2007),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119662974358911035.html). A subprime mortgage study conducted by the
Wall Street Journal found that of the subprime mortgages obtained since 2000, 55% of the borrowers had
credit scores that qualified for conventional mortgages; by 2001, that number jumped to 61%. Id.
108
Christine Riccardi, 40% of Subprime Mortgages Stand Delinquent, Can Prime Be Next?,
HOUSINGWIRE.COM (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.housingwire.com/2010/09/07/40-of-subprime-mortgagesstand-delinquent-can-prime-be-next.
109
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608–609 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (quoting M & T
Mortgage Corp. v. Foy, 858 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)). Higher interest rate mortgages in a
predominantly minority neighborhood typically indicate discriminatory lending practices and warrants
further investigation. See M & T Mortgage Corp., 858 N.Y.S.2d at 569–70.
110
Elizabeth A. Duke, Member, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Rebalancing the Housing
Market, Speech Before the Fed. Reserve Bd. Policy Forum: The Housing Market Going Forward: Lessons
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frontier of new mortgage lending and foreclosure processes.
D. Unforeseen Consequences of Foreclosures
From the thousands of reported foreclosure fiascos, it becomes clear that
foreclosure procedures and processes must be rehabilitated in order to provide adequate
protections for the consumer-at-large and lenders. However, any modification to the
processes must be thoughtful, examining the implications of such changes on other areas.
1. Prolonged Market Crisis
The foreclosure crisis has had a domino effect in other sectors of the economy.
According to Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, as a result of the depressed housing
market, the construction industry is destabilized.111 Even though homeownership is the
most affordable it has been in recent history, due to low home prices and record low
interest rates, innumerable Americans are unable to qualify for loans due to tightened
lending criterion.112 If lenders continue to tighten credit terms, thereby shrinking the
credit supply and making it nearly impossible for consumers to qualify for loans, then
one result is the continuation of the market depression.113 Furthermore, potential
homebuyers have been timid about entering into the housing market due to uncertainties
pertaining to home values and/or the job market.114 Subsequently, the market would be
left with a large inventory of available homes, which floods the housing market, further
lowers home values and stalls new home construction.115 Because the state of the national
economy is, in large part, tied to the health of the real estate market, an unhealthy real
estate market will prolong the stabilization of the national economy.116
2. Burden on Other Resources
Today’s foreclosures are not only a lender or borrower’s problem; the fallout has
had an effect on other governmental resources. As the number of foreclosure filings
surges, burdens on resources in other areas increase, such as bankruptcy courts,
municipal governments, and sheriffs’ departments. There appears to be a direct parallel
between the number of bankruptcy filings and the number of foreclosure filings. Since
Learned From the Recent Crisis (Sept. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/duke 20110901a.htm; Shane M. Sherlund, Mortgage
Defaults, FED. RESERVE 9 (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/region/foreclosure_resource_center/more_mortgage_defau
lts.pdf.
111
Benjamin S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., The U.S. Economic Outlook,
Speech at the International Monetary Conference (June 7, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ speech/bernanke20110607a.htm.
112
Id.
113
Ashley & Wilson, supra note 52 (arguing that a “credit crunch makes it nearly impossible for companies
to borrow, because lenders are afraid of bankruptcies and defaults that result in higher interest rates. The
consequence is a prolonged recession (or slower recovery) and it occurs as a result of the shrinking credit
supply.”).
114
Bernanke, supra note 111.
115
Id.
116
Id.
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2006, bankruptcy filings, both commercial and consumer filings, have steadily increased
from 617,660 to 1,593,081 in 2010.117 Due to the economic issues many faced,
bankruptcy filings increased to over 6000 per day in May 2009.118 Many bankruptcy
filings are likely due to the same reason for mortgage delinquency and foreclosures: lack
of income due to job loss.
Once faced with a foreclosure action, a mortgagor might choose to save his or her
home by filing bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or 13.119 In the ten states with the
highest rates of foreclosures in the first quarter of 2011, a surge appeared in bankruptcy
filings from 2007 to 2010, with significant growth in 2009.120 For example, bankruptcy
filings for the top three states of Nevada, Arizona, and California either doubled or tripled
during the relevant time period. In Nevada, consumer bankruptcy actions rose from
10,632 in 2007 to 29,161 in 2010 while consumer actions jumped from 10,441 in 2007 to
41,193 in 2010 in Arizona.121 California consumer bankruptcy filings escalated from
69,110 in 2007 to 251,396.122
Similarly, municipalities are burdened when foreclosures cause a large
concentration of distressed properties in one area. As a recent study on foreclosures in
Chicago points out, “the focus on credit impaired and higher risk borrowers leads to a
natural tendency for nonprime foreclosures to cluster in lower-income and largely
minority distressed urban areas.”123 The study further states that “[t]his tendency for
nonprime foreclosures to cluster generates significant negative spillover effects.”124 The
spillover effects include those ills that typically accompany vacant foreclosed properties,
117

Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Office of Public Affairs, Growth in Bankruptcy Filings
Slow in Calendar Year 2010 (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-0215/Growth_in_Bankruptcy_Filings_Slows_In_Calendar_Year_2010.aspx. The new release shows the pace
of bankruptcy filings slowing down, but does not demonstrate a decrease in number of filings. The number
of Chapter 7 bankruptcies increased as follows: 1) 360,890 in 2006; 2) 519,364 in 2007; 3) 744,364 in
2008; 4) 1,050,832 in 2009; and 5) 1,139,601 in 2010. Chapter 13 filings also increased over time as
follows: 1) 251,179 in 2006; 2) 324,771 in 2007; 3) 362,705 in 2008; 4) 406,962 in 2009; and 5) 438,912 in
2010. Id.; see also Press Release, Am. Bankruptcy Inst., Consumer Bankruptcy Filings Increase 9 Percent
in 2010 (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=62756&TEMPLATE=/CM/C
ontentDisplay.cfm.
118
Christine Dugas, Bankruptcy Filings Rise to 6,000 a Day as Job Losses Take Toll, USA TODAY (June 3,
2009), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2009-06-03-bankruptcy-filings-unemployment_N.htm.
119
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (2011); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2011); Les Christie, Bankruptcy Can Save
Your House from Foreclosure, CNN MONEY (July 24, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/21/real_estate/bankruptcy_and_foreclosure/index.htm (noting that
bankruptcy might be an aid to those with ongoing income over foreclosure).
120
Bankruptcy Filing Statistics by State, Table: Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by State (2007–
2010), AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE,
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&CONTENTID=63179 (last visited Mar. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Filing Statistics by State,
2007–2010].
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
William C. Apgar, Mark Duda & Rochelle N. Gorey, Municipal Cost of Foreclosures: A Chicago Case
Study, REPORT FOR HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUNDATION 2 (Feb. 27, 2005),
http://www.995hope.org/wp-content/uploads /2011/ 07/Apgar_Duda_Study_Full_Version.pdf.
124
Id.
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such as, crime, violence and vagrancy.125
In non-judicial foreclosures, sheriffs preside over foreclosure sales.126 Sheriffs’
departments may also deliver service of process, including eviction notices or writs of
possession and unlawful detainer.127 For example, after the number of eviction notices
delivered nearly tripled, the Virginia Sheriffs’ Association held a press conference to
focus on the mounting burden on their sheriffs’ departments due to the increase in
foreclosure filings.128
E. Pre-Lending Reform Efforts
While it is apparent that our country is in dire need of restructured mortgage and
foreclosure mechanisms, there are several other areas that need attention as well. First, it
is important to note that a large number of foreclosures arose from systemic defects
during the pre-lending phase. Complications associated with delinquency and foreclosure
will continue unless consumers are educated more thoroughly about credit and the
consequences of credit default. Many homeowners now face foreclosure because they
accepted mortgages that they could not afford to pay in the first place.
Similarly, numerous borrowers are uneducated about differences between the types
of loan products available. As such, some lenders were able to prey on this lack of
sophistication and offer subprime adjustable rate mortgages. Lawmakers in a few
jurisdictions unsuccessfully introduced legislation requiring lenders to either make
prudent determinations of borrowers’ ability to repay the loan or make borrowers aware
of the ramifications of the loan choices.129 Massachusetts legislators tried to impose a ban
on subprime adjustable rate mortgages unless mortgagors received qualified counseling
on the potential consequences of those loans.130 Likewise, Maryland state senators tried
to prohibit a lender or other credit grantor from “completing an application for a
subprime loan until the lender or credit grantor receives proof that the borrower
completed home buyer education or housing counseling.”131
Also, some mortgage brokers were encouraging real estate appraisers to improperly
appraise homes for more than they were worth.132 These inflated appraisals resulted in
125

Id.
What Does Sheriff Sales Mean in Foreclosure, S.F. CHRON., http://homeguides.sfgate.com/sheriff-salesmean-foreclosures-9082.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
127
Richard Foster, Evictions Are Keeping Sheriff’s Office Busy, CHESTERFIELD OBSERVER (July 29, 2009),
http://www.chesterfieldobserver.com/news/2009-07-29/home/002.html.
128
Id.
129
See, e.g., H.B. 2517, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.F. 2449, 82nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Iowa 2008); S.B. 186, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.B. 279, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2008); A.B.
1764, 2008 Leg., 213th Sess. (N.J. 2008); A.B. 1879, 2008 Leg., 213th Sess. (N.J. 2008); S.B. 1090, 74th
Leg. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Or. 2008); H.B. 1093, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); and H.B. 1097, 2008
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008).
130
S.B. 2299, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2008); see also H.B. 3345, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2008); and S.B. 3834, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).
131
H.B. 944, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008).
132
See, e.g., Michael D. Larson, Appraisers Can Burst Your Bubble by Inflating the Value of Your Home,
BANKRATE.COM (Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/20000525.asp (noting that there
is an “acknowledged problem” that loan originators, who may be paid on commission, might “sometimes
pressure appraisers to fudge their numbers to make mortgages work”).
126
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borrowers being upside down in their mortgages. A borrower who owes more than his
home's worth is unable to refinance and may choose to default on his mortgage, resulting
in a foreclosure. Additionally, foreclosure on overinflated home values will ultimately
cause banks losses. For example, it is estimated that Washington Mutual Bank lost $284
million on mortgages related to inflated real estate appraisals.133
IV. REFORMATION OF FORECLOSURE PROCESSES IN THE MODERN MORTGAGE
AND HOUSING CRISIS
There are many philosophies on what is necessary to reform the embattled lending
and foreclosure systems. As the new systems take shape, state and federal legislators and
policymakers have drawn inspiration from historical models and designed new
mechanisms as well. Because issues related to the housing and foreclosure collapse affect
various aspects of the federal and state governments, many legislators and policymakers
have rushed to find solutions. Some of the proposed solutions include uniform servicing
guidelines, mandatory or voluntary settlement conferences or mediation, delays in the
foreclosure process or foreclosure moratoria.134
A. Too Many Cooks: Spoiled Foreclosure Reform?
As stated previously, there have been many actors, state and federal, involved in
foreclosure reform efforts.135 Legislatures in nearly every state and Puerto Rico have
introduced legislation in response to the foreclosure and housing crisis.136 States’
attorneys general have similarly proposed solutions to modify current mortgage and
foreclosure procedures.137 Consumer advocacy groups and lenders are also taking part in
133

Mark Puente, Lawsuit Says Unqualified Property Appraisers Inflated Values, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June
11, 2011), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/realestate /lawsuit-says-unqualified-propertyappraisers-inflated-values/1174676.
134
Some lending institutions have also been proactive in making necessary adjustments to curb
foreclosures. Two major lending institutions have readily admitted to committing errors during the
foreclosure process. In 2010, both GMAC and JP Morgan Chase suspended their foreclosure procedures in
twenty-three states due to “legal missteps.” See David Streitfeld, Foreclosures Slow as Document Flaws
Emerge, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/business/01mortgage.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1316307736yXaQdV
0xaGfebBEckl2SMA. In New York, seventeen members of the armed services recently settled a lawsuit
accusing Morgan Stanley of improperly foreclosing against their property between January 2006 and June
2009 for $2.35 million. Dawn Kopecki, JP Morgan Ousts Mortgage Chief Lowman, BLOOMBERG (June 14,
2011), http://www.bloomberg. com/news/2011-06-14/jpmorgan-ousts-mortgage-chief-david-lowman-afterlapses-over-foreclosures.html. Critics argue that these voluntary moratoria are not too altruistic, but are due
to the firestorm and external pressures that followed the exposure of the robo-signing or other foreclosure
missteps. Peter Miller, Did Unsafe and Unsound Practices Lead to Foreclosure Robo-Signing?,
MONEYRATES (June 1, 2011), http://www.money-rates.com/advancedstrategies/mortgages/did-unsafe-andunsound-practices-lead-to-foreclosure-robo-signing.htm.
135
For an excellent overview of state and federal foreclosure legislation, see Julie R. Caggiano et al.,
Developments in State and Federal Mortgage Lending Laws: Predatory Lending and Beyond, 65 BUS.
LAW. 383 (2010).
136
Id.
137
See Redefault Rates Improve, supra note 20.
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the reformation.138
On the federal level, there are several federal regulators and agencies that oversee
mortgage lending and consumer protection. For instance, the mission of the U.S.
Department of Housing and Development (HUD) is to “create strong, sustainable,
inclusive communities” in addition to strengthening “the housing market to bolster the
economy and protect consumers.”139 Along with the Treasury Department, HUD
administers numerous programs designed to assist new homeowners and avoid
foreclosure. Making Homes Affordable is one of HUD’s most recognizable programs,
from which HAMP and HARP spring.140 HUD’s Office of Housing oversees the Fair
Housing Administration (FHA). Within the FHA, the National Servicing Center provides
foreclosure assistance and avoidance strategies to FHA-insured homeowners.141
Like HUD, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) regulates “banking institutions to
ensure the safety and soundness of the nation’s banking and financial systems to protect
the credit rights of consumers.”142 One of FRB’s expressed functions includes
administering nationwide banking and credit policies.143 Similarly, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) stated mission is to examine and supervise financial
institutions for safety and soundness and consumer protection.144 The FDIC issues guides
for banks and consumer educational publications.145
Another federal regulator that plays a role in foreclosure reform is the Office of
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The OCC regulates and supervises all national
banks and federal savings associations. The goal of the OCC is to ensure that the banks
and savings associations it regulates “operate in a safe and sound manner and in
compliance with laws requiring fair treatment of their customers and fair access to credit
and financial products.”146 The OCC is also authorized to issue rules and regulations
regarding lending and other practices, such as debt collecting or foreclosures.147
In 2010, the four federal bank regulators—OCC, OTS, FRB, and FDIC—
conducted on-site reviews of the foreclosure policies and procedures at fourteen
138

Testimony of Thompson, supra note 32.
Mission, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/about/mission (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
140
Avoiding Foreclosure, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/avoiding_foreclosure (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
141
FHA National Servicing Center Loss Mitigation Services, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/sfh/nsc/lossmit (last visited Mar. 20,
2012).
142
The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. 1 (9th
ed. 2005) http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf.
143
Id. at 6.
144
FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. (May 4, 2009),
www.fdic.gov/about/mission/index.html.
145
Id.
146
About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
147
Id. The Office of Thrift Security (OTS) took part in savings association regulation until July 21, 2011,
when it became a part of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). History, OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/history/history.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012).
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nationwide, federally regulated mortgage servicers.148 In April 2011, the regulators issued
a report of their on-site review findings.149 In the report, the examiners exposed several
critical foreclosure process shortcomings by the collective servicers. These deficiencies
include problems with servicers’ governance processes, management and control of third
party vendors (e.g., law firms and MERS, etc.), and foreclosure documentation and
preparation.150 According to the bank regulators, these shortfalls “resulted in unsafe and
unsound practices and violations of applicable federal and state law and requirements.”151
Following the examiners’ review, the FRB issued formal enforcement actions to
the four mortgage servicers it regulates, requiring the servicers to address the inadequate
foreclosure processes and deficient residential mortgage loan servicing practices in
2011.152 Parent holding companies of ten banks were ordered to improve management of
all residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processes.153 Primarily, the FRB
mandated that servicers submit plans that: a) improve communications with borrowers by
providing borrowers with the name of a single point of contact; b) safeguard against
engaging in foreclosure activities when a servicer has previously approved loan
modification; c) set forth oversight procedures over third party vendors, such as law
firms; d) establish a remediation process for borrowers who incurred financial losses as a
result of wrongful foreclosure; and e) warrant compliance with state and federal servicing
and foreclosure laws.154 Further, the FRB issued formal enforcement actions against
Lender Processing Services and MERSCORP.
In 2010, the federal government added another player to the bank regulation and
consumer protection arena. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
developed out of the Dodd-Frank Act.155 The CFPB drafts rules, supervises, and enforces
federal consumer protection laws.156 Title III of Dodd-Frank abolished one of the federal
regulators, OTS, and expanded duties of others, such as the FRB.
With so many involved, state legislatures, attorneys general, federal regulators and
agencies, there will undoubtedly be inconsistent and various rules and regulations
because all have broad authority to create and implement rules and regulations. Ideally
148

FORECLOSURE POLICIES & PRACTICES, supra note 89. The bank regulators reviewed the foreclosure
practices and procedures from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010 at the following banks: Ally
Bank/GMAC, Aurora Bank, Bank of America, Citibank, EverBank, HSBC, JPMoganChase, MetLife,
OneWest, PNC, Sovereign Bank, Sun Trust, US Bank, and Wells Fargo. The aim of the review was to
“evaluate the adequacy of controls and governance over servicers’ foreclosure processes and assess
servicers’ authority to foreclose.” Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Issues Enforcement Actions Related
to Deficient Practices in Residential Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Processing (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20110413a.htm.
153
Id. The ten banks to which this request applied are Bank of America, Citigroup, Ally Financial, HSBC
North America, JPMorganChase, MetLife, PNC, SunTrust, US Bancorp, and Wells Fargo. Id.
154
Id.
155
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
The CFPB must confer with the applicable prudential regulator or agency before proposing a rule or
regulation. Id. at § 1002 (24). Prudential regulators or agencies include the FDIC, OCC, FRB, and National
Credit Union Administration. Id.
156
Id. at § 311.

475

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

state and federal officials could jointly modify foreclosure processes and develop
mechanisms to supervise servicers and protect homeowners. Both sides initially began
working together, but progress stalled when the parties reached a deadlock.157
One hindrance is that states and the federal government want foreclosure reform,
but have no collective thought on how to accomplish it. The federal government has no
preemptive power over states, who may draft their own reformation rules without
consulting with or seeking prior approval from federal regulators, OCC and FRB.158
Thus, tensions are natural as states invade the OCC and FRB’s territory of foreclosure
reform.159 Moreover, even though there are natural tensions between state and federal
governments, even states have been unable to compromise to create uniform state
regulation.160 As states are generally in parity, no one state may emerge as the “leader” in
the reform effort.161 Consequently, there is choppy federal and state regulation.
B. Uniform Mortgage Servicing Guidelines
Federal regulatory agencies are striving to create uniformity in at least one area:
mortgage servicing. Sarah Raskin of the Federal Reserve Board declares “[t]he longer it
takes for mortgage servicers to make the operational adjustments necessary to fix their
sloppy and deceptive practices, the costlier, more difficult it becomes for them to sort
them out and correct them.”162 Thus, federal agencies are in the process of generating
uniform mortgage servicing guidelines to address the current system of capricious
standards for loan modification by servicers.
Mortgage loan servicers handle the daily aspects of a mortgage loan, such as
posting mortgage loan payments.163 Mortgage loan servicers may be lenders, but could
also be separate entities entirely.164 Servicers are required to notify borrowers on which
company serves as the mortgage loan servicer.165 Borrowers, upon proper notice, make
mortgage payments to the servicer, which credits the appropriate account. However, upon
default, a servicer has the authority to negotiate mortgage workouts or modifications or
commence foreclosure proceedings.166
157

Maxwell Strachan, State Officials, Federal Regulators Could Issue Separate Orders for Foreclosure
Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2011), http://www.HuffingtonPost.com/2011/04/2/mortgagesettlement-state-federal_n_847934.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Michael King, Foreclosures, Loan Modification Reform May Stall Due to Lack of Leadership, TOTAL
MORTGAGE SERVICES (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.totalmortgage.com/blog/Foreclosures/ForeclosureLoan-Modification-Reform-May-Stall-Due-To-Lack-Of-Leadership/111129.
161
Id. (quoting Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, “Nobody is driving the bus. Or to put it more certainly,
each agency gets an hour to drive the bus.”).
162
Raskin, supra note 66.
163
Mortgage Servicing: Making Sure Your Payments Count, FED. TRADE COMM. (2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/homes/rea10.shtm.
164
Glen Setzer, Mortgage Servicing Rights: Traded Like Baseball Cards?, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (June
6, 2005), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/662005_Mortgage_Servicing.asp
165
Id.
166
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-93, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: ADDITIONAL
MORTGAGE SERVICER ACTIONS COULD HELP REDUCE THE FREQUENCY AND IMPACT OF ABANDONED
FORECLOSURES 1–2 (2010).
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One major problem that consumers encounter when seeking mortgage workouts or
modifications is that the identity of loan servicers might change a number of times as the
mortgage is sold repeatedly on the secondary mortgage market.167 Thus, a borrower may
struggle to find the proper party to contact for help. In some instances, even though a loan
servicer is known by the borrower, requests for relief may fall on deaf ears due to a
servicer’s unwillingness to meet borrowers’ needs.168
The year 2009 proved to be a year of major change with the enactment of several
federal foreclosure protection regulations coming into fruition.169 Perhaps sensing a
change in the tide, in 2009, borrowers began complaining that although mortgage
servicers had the ability to negotiate loan workouts or modifications, a large majority of
loan servicers failed to do so, causing foreclosure numbers to escalate.170 For example, in
2009, the Ohio Attorney General filed suit against American Home Mortgage Servicing,
Inc. (American Home), which serviced approximately 17,000 subprime loans in the state,
for violating the Ohio Consumer Sales Practice Act.171 The Attorney General alleged that
American Home ignored “requests for assistance,” provided “incompetent and inadequate
customer service,” failed “to modify loans in a timely fashion,” and provided “unfair and
deceptive terms when it did modify loans.”172
Unwilling to take responsibility for issues related to borrowers’ complaints, some
loan servicers “passed the buck” by using the secondary mortgage market as an excuse
for not modifying a borrower’s mortgage. For example, servicers would argue that only
the investors, who owned the borrower’s mortgage in an investment pool, could modify
loans.173 Some made this argument even when the agreement between the mortgage loan
servicer and investors did not bar a servicer’s ability to modify or work out a loan.174
Though 2009 was an active year for federal intervention, the federal government
had played a somewhat limited role in addressing the mortgage foreclosure catastrophe in
years prior. Beginning in 2008, however, it became apparent that the roaring fire of the
crisis was gaining strength and the Housing and Economy Recovery Act (HERA) became
law.175 Part of HERA included the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, which provided
167

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-90-62, HOME OWNERSHIP: MORTGAGE SERVICING
TRANSFERS ARE INCREASING AND CAUSING BORROWER CONCERN 5 (1989).
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See generally Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2011).
169
See, e.g., Housing Programs, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/programs/housing-programs/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Apr. 2, 2012).
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Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Grind on as Lenders Fail to Modify Loans, USA TODAY (June 19,
2007), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2009-06-18-obama-plan-mortgages_N.htm
(reporting on the delay, misinformation, and miscommunication from lenders as borrowers seek loan
modifications); Steve Wartenberg, Ohio Alleges Mortgage Servicer Failing to Modify Loans, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2009/11/06/Mortgage_Servicer_Sued.ART_ART_11-0609_A12_K9FJ8A5.html.
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Karen Weise, When Denying Loan Modifications, Mortgage Servicers Often Wrongly Blame Investors,
PROPUBLICA (July 23, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://www.probulica.org/article/when-denying-loan-mods-loanservicers-often-blame-investors-wrongly.
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Id.
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Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008).
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local and state governments with $4 billion “for the redevelopment of abandoned and
foreclosed upon homes and residential properties.”176
Subsequently, the Obama Administration introduced the Making Homes
Affordable Program (MHA) to reduce the number of foreclosures many Americans faced
in March 2009.177 Under the MHA, qualified borrowers could get help in negotiating
lower monthly payments or refinancing interest rates.178 Although many programs
compose the MHA, the two most significant are the Home Affordability Modification
Program (HAMP) and Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP).179
The Obama Administration hoped to give homeowners an economic “do-over”
through modification or refinance. Unfortunately, however, both HAMP and HARP
proved to be less than the panacea that the Administration anticipated.180 Program flaws
with HAMP and HARP became fairly apparent by 2010.181 The weaknesses included
“poor execution, repeated program restructuring, inadequate bank manpower and
paperwork delays.”182 Further, only a small percentage of all eligible, affected
homeowners have actually received relief under HAMP and HARP.183
On May 12, 2011, Diane Thompson, legal counsel for the National Consumer Law
Center, testified before a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee regarding
the need for more regulation on mortgage loan servicers, noting their “rogue-ness” and
lack of accountability.184 According to Thompson,
Servicers have been and remain largely unaccountable to all stake holders
for their actions. Servicers do not believe that the rules that apply to
176

Id. at § 2301(a).
Home Affordability Modification Program, FREDDIE MAC,
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/service/mha_modification.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2012).
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180
Acknowledging that the Home Affordability Modification Program (HAMP) has not worked, the
Obama Administration introduced a plan, which allowed some unemployed borrowers to miss up to a year
of payments on government-insured mortgages while the borrower seeks employment. See Jim
Puzzanghera, Obama Administration Boosts Aid for Unemployed Homeowners, L.A. TIMES (July 27,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/07/business/la-fi-foreclosure-aid-20110708.
181
After it modified HAMP to add a modification component for second liens on August 13, 2009, the
Treasury Department totally revamped the policy guidelines by replacing Supplemental Directive 09-05
with Supplemental Directive 09-05 Revised. Fannie Mae, Announcement SVC-2010-14, Home
Affordability Modification Program: Introduction of Second Lien Modification Program (Sept. 21, 2010),
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2010/svc1014.pdf. However, these modifications
did not help achieve the hoped-for results.
182
Lauren Tara La Capra, Mortgage Mayhem: Homeowners Stranded, THE STREET (Aug. 18, 2010),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10835727/1/mortgage-mayhem-homeowners-stranded.html.
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Craig D. Robins, Problems Continue with HAMP and Federal Mortgage Programs—Is HAMP Dying?,
LONG ISLAND BANKR. BLOG (May 18, 2010), http://long islandbankruptcyblog.com/problems-with-hamfederal-mortgage-programs-is-hamp-dying/ (posting that only 295,348 homeowners have obtained
permanent loan modification out of the 3.2 million eligible mortgagors and mounting frustrations from
those still seeking relief); see also Duke, supra note 110; Testimony of Thompson, supra note 32 (stating
that many of the problems she mentioned were due to servicers’ actions, including, but not limited to,
extensive noncompliance with HAMP requirements, wrongful denial of HAMP benefits, pressuring
borrowers to opt out of HAMP benefits, or repeatedly ignoring HAMP applications) .
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everyone else apply to them. This lawless attitude, supported by financial
incentives and too-often tolerated by regulators, is the root cause of the
failure of HAMP and the wrongful foreclosure of countless American
families.185
Thompson argued that HAMP began to fail almost from its inception.186
Along with others, Thompson endorsed a uniform mortgage servicing system “to
rein in servicer abuses and restore transparency to our mortgage markets.”187 In her view,
the national mortgage servicing program should do several things. Thompson argues that
a uniform mortgage servicing system should: a) eradicate the dual track foreclosure
system by initiating modification prior to the start of a foreclosure procedure or by
staying foreclosure proceedings;188 b) offer permanent and affordable modifications to
eligible homeowners;189 c) include an appeals mechanism for homeowners denied
modification;190 d) include full documentation of investor restrictions and a required
waiver of any prohibitions against modification;191 e) be principal reductions if there is a
net benefit to investors;192 f) eliminate the conflict between servicers and homeowners by
limiting servicers’ fees to a reasonable amount, permitting a servicer to conduct its
duties;193 g) permit homeowners to seek the help of a community mediator to resolve outof-litigation problems;194 and h) help lower income homeowners receive increased
funding for legal services representation.195
As Thompson advocates, federal bank regulating agencies are developing uniform
mortgage servicing guidelines to “promote safe and sound operation of mortgage
servicing and foreclosure processing, including standards for accountability and
responsiveness to borrower concerns.”196 In July 2011, the Federal Reserve Board and
other bank regulators conducted a horizontal review of fourteen large federally regulated
mortgage servicers.197 The review exposed serious flaws on multiple levels. The
185

Id.
Id. at 8.
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Id. at 9. Mortgage Bankers Association CEO David Stevens emphasized that truly national mortgage
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shortcomings were related to “foreclosure governance practices, foreclosuredocumentation processes, and oversight and monitoring of third party law firms and other
vendors.”198 Additionally, there were “deficiencies in loan files, inadequate staffing and
training, undue emphasis on quantitative production and timeliness instead of quality and
adequate workload monitoring.”199 The Board and federal bank regulators recommended
stronger policy and control procedures and more expansive monitoring of servicing
activities.200 Drawing from the findings and recommendations of the horizontal review,
the federal bank regulators201 will develop uniform mortgage servicing guidelines that
“are expected to address the proper handling of both performing and non-performing
loans, including loss-mitigation procedures and foreclosure processing . . . .”202 The
overall goal of the uniform mortgage servicing guideline is to improve “customer
treatment” and provide “better transparency and oversight of mortgage servicers’
processes.”203
As of January 2012, however, no uniform servicing rules have been adopted.204 All
states’ attorneys general submitted a report that provided for an alternative of principal
reduction as a part of the uniform servicing rules.205 However, in March 2011, Bank of
America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and GMAC proposed “Draft
Alternative Uniform Servicing Standards.”206 The banks proposed “timelines for
processing modifications, third party review of foreclosures, and single point contact for
financially troubled borrowers.”207 With the number of parties involved in creating these
uniform standards, reaching consensus might prove both complicated and far-off.
C. Strict Compliance with Loan Documents and/or Foreclosure Procedures
or Related Laws
In the midst of economic disaster, and with no uniform guidelines before them,
numerous courts are ensuring proper foreclosure by insisting on strict compliance with
foreclosure laws and loan agreements. One of the main pre-foreclosure limitations is that
GMAC/Ally Bank, HSBC, OneWest, J.P. Morgan Chase, MetLife, PNC Bank, Sovereign Bank, Sun Trust,
US Bank, and Wells Fargo. See Recent Developments: Defects in Mortgage Servicing and Foreclosure
Processes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutes and Consumer Credit, Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (Julie L.
Williams, First Sr. Deputy Comp. & Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
198
Fed. Res. Bd. Statement, supra note 197.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
The federal bank regulators involved in designing the uniform mortgage servicing guidelines are the
Federal Reserve Bank, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Housing Administration, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, and Federal Housing Agency. Id. All fifty state
attorneys general are also involved in drafting the uniform foreclosure and servicing rules.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
The Regulation of Mortgage Servicing Bill, S. 967, 112th Cong. (2011), is still in committee.
205
Dan Fitzpatrick, Banks Offer Own Mortgage-Servicing Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424057622931293172884.html.
206
Id.
207
Id.
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the mortgagee must act in strict compliance with the power of sale language in nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdictions.208 Courts have addressed these issues recently.
In Hooker v. Northwest Trustee Services, Inc.,209 a federal court in Oregon required
strict compliance with its statute and dismissed a non-judicial foreclosure action due to a
lender’s failure to properly record all note assignments.210 In Hooker, the debtors, Ivan
and Katherine Hooker, obtained a loan from GN Mortgage, LLC. (GN). GN secured the
loan by a trust deed which listed GN as the lender, MERS211 as the beneficiary and
Regional Trustee Services Corp. as trustee.212 The trust deed was recorded in the county
where the land was situated.213 As is common on the secondary market, the beneficiary
interest switched hands several times.214 Following the debtors’ default, MERS assigned
the trust deed to Bank of America.215 This assignment was also recorded in the county
land records where the property was located.216 However, the court discovered that there
were two beneficiary interest transfers that were not recorded in the county land records,
but were noted in MERS.217 Strictly adhering to applicable Oregon statutes,218 the court
held that MERS could not pursue a non-judicial foreclosure, but could elect to pursue a
judicial foreclosure.219
In the same vein, Massachusetts courts will not confirm valid title if a mortgagee is
unable to show the required proof that it was the mortgage holder at the time of
foreclosure.220 In U.S. Bank v. Ibanez,221 U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo, as purported
208

See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011) (recognizing the rule that “one
who sells under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms. If he fails to do so there is no valid
execution of the power, and the sale is wholly void.”)
209
Hooker v. Northwest Trustee Services, No. 10-3111-PA, 2011 WL 2119103 (D. Or. May 25, 2011).
210
Id. at *3.
211
To facilitate recording of mortgages that were being resold as securities, the mortgage industry created
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., or MERS. However, MERS announced that it will no
longer participate in foreclosure and bankruptcy businesses effective July 22, 2011. See Carrie Bay, MERS
Bows Out of Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Proceedings, DSNEWS.COM (July 27, 2011),
http://www.dsnews.com/articles/mers-bows-out-of-foreclosure-and-bankruptcy-proceedings-2011-07-27.
212
Hooker, No. 10-3111-PA, 2011 WL 2119103, at *1.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id. at *3–5; see also California Orders GMAC Mortgage to Suspend Foreclosures, CONSUMER AFFAIRS
(Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2010/09/california-orders-gmac-mortgage-tosuspend-foreclosures.html (noting that the California governor demanded that GMAC/Ally Financial prove
that it is in compliance with state law as a prerequisite to filing a foreclosure action); James v. U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n, 272 F.R.D. 47, 48–49 (D. Me. 2011) (finding GMAC liable for monetary sanctions because it
submitted an affidavit without personal knowledge); GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. McCarthy, No. S1543-09,
2010 WL 4155261 (Vt. Super. Ct. 2010) (involving the submission of a revised affidavit when the first
affidavit was filed without personal knowledge or in the presence of a notary public).
218
OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735(1) (2011) (allowing a trustee to foreclose using a trust deed by advertisement
and sale if: “trust deed, any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary . . . are recorded
in the mortgage records in the counties in which the property described in the deed is situated.”).
219
Hooker, No. 10-3111-PA, 2011 WL 2119103, at *6-7 (quoting In re McCoy, 2011 WL 477820, at *4
(D. Or. 2011) that “Oregon law permits foreclosure without the benefit of a judicial proceeding only when
the interest of the beneficiary is clearly documented in a public record.”).
220
See, e.g., U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011).
221
Id. at 44.
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assignees, foreclosed on properties in two separate actions in 2007.222 After their nonjudicial foreclosure sales, the lenders filed separate complaints in the Land Court
requesting it to quiet title in them so that they could convey clear title to third parties.223
Massachusetts law, in actions for declaration of clear title following non-judicial
foreclosure sales, requires plaintiffs to prove entitlement to the relief sought.224 Thus, the
Court held that U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo needed to prove that they were assignees and
holders of the mortgages at the notices of sale and subsequent foreclosure sales stages.225
Because the mortgages were sold several times, there was a substantial delay by the
record holder of the mortgages to execute the assignments.226 In fact, it took more than a
year after each foreclosure sale for executed assignments to U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo
to be recorded.227 Accordingly, the Court denied the relief sought and refused to clear the
title.228 The Court adhered to the rule that “one who sells under a power [of sale] must
follow strictly its terms. If he fails to do so there is no valid execution of the power and
the sale is wholly void.”229 Similarly, New York law protects a homeowner against fraud,
unfair dealing and theft of its home equity. This law is called the Home Equity Theft
Prevention Act (HETPA).230 HETPA requires a foreclosing lender to “deliver statutoryspecific notice to the homeowner, together with the summons and complaint.”231 During
a foreclosure action, a mortgagee or assignee has the burden to substantiate strict
compliance with HETPA.232 Mortgagee’s failure to prove strict compliance may result in
a court’s dismissal of the foreclosure action.233 Furthermore, homeowners may allege
noncompliance or require proof of compliance as an affirmative defense or at any stage
of the action.234
Due to the mortgage and foreclosure downfall, mortgagees, trustees, and/or
beneficiaries are quickly discovering that courts are being more stringent pertaining to
compliance with foreclosure laws or related laws as conditions precedent to enforcement
of foreclosure rights.235 Lender or servicer noncompliance will result in dismissal of a
foreclosure action, either immediately or years after a foreclosure action.236 Therefore,
222

Id. at 47.
Id.
224
Id. at 48.
225
Id. at 51.
226
Id. at 52.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 49–50 (quoting Moore v. Dick, 72 N.E.2d 967, 968 (Mass. 1905)). This rule only applies because
there is limited judicial oversight in non-judicial foreclosures.
230
N.Y. PROPERTY § 265-a (McKinney 2011).
231
See First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Silver, 899 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). In U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n v. Martha Flynn, the court blocked the eviction of a former mortgagor more than a year after
the foreclosure because the foreclosing party could not prove that it held the beneficiary interest at the time
of foreclosure. No. 11-8011 (Columbia Cnty. Or. Cir. Ct. June 23, 2011), available at
http://media.oregonlive.com/business_impact/other/usbank%20v%20flynn%20fed%20win%20oregon(1).p
df.
232
Silver, 899 N.Y.S at 259.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 165.
235
Id.
236
See, e.g., U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011).
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mortgagees must start the foreclosure process over again. The costs of the unenforceable
foreclosure are borne by the mortgagee. Hence, lenders have more setbacks with nonjudicial foreclosures than they did traditionally, impeding a mortgagee’s ability to
foreclose quickly.
D. Loan Modifications, Settlement Conferences, and Penalties for Lenders’ Failure to Act
in Good Faith
1. Loan Modifications
i. State Loan Modification Efforts
Some courts and legislatures are not simply delaying the process of foreclosure, but
are hoping to avoid them altogether by affording mortgagors an opportunity to reach a
work-out or loan modification.
California. California law requires lenders to engage in loan modification
discussions with their borrowers to avoid foreclosures.237 The amended law clearly states
that the legislature’s intent is “that the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent offer
the borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a modification or plan is
consistent with its contractual or other authority.”238 However, this law does not
adequately help borrowers avoid foreclosure because it neither explicitly imposes a duty
on lenders to modify a mortgage nor gives borrowers a right to sue under the statute.239
Oregon. The Oregon legislature sought to prevent the high number of homeowner
foreclosures by amending Oregon’s foreclosure laws in 2009.240 Senate Bill 628 amended
Oregon Revised Statutes § 86.740 by mandating mediation between the trustee and
grantor before a foreclosure sale based on a residential trust deed.241 The purpose of the
mediation is to avoid a foreclosure sale. Therefore, either a trustee or grantor may offer a
reasonable settlement proposal that amends the original loan agreement.242 Failure to
comply with the mandatory mediation requirements may result in the beneficiary’s ability
to foreclose on the trust deed.243 Unfortunately, however, legislators soon discovered that
modified law was not the anecdote to the state’s foreclosure problems; more revisions
were necessary.
In 2011, legislators revisited the issues and introduced Senate Bill 827244 to solve
the problems unaddressed by the 2009 amendments. Particularly, the legislators
discovered three main issues with the 2009 law. First, many homeowners did not
participate in the mediation sessions; some simply failed to file requests for modifications

237

CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.6 (West 2011).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.6 (b) (West 2011).
239
See Argueta v. J.P. Morgan Chase, No. CIV. 2:11–441, 2011 WL 1376701, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12,
2011) (following Farner v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 08cv2193, 2009 WL 189025, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
2009)).
240
S.B. 628, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).
241
OR. REV. STAT. § 86.740 (4) (2009).
242
OR. REV. STAT. § 86.740 (5) (2009).
243
OR. REV. STAT. § 86.740 (5)(1) (2009).
244
S.B. 827, 76th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2011).
238
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and reviews within the requisite timeline.245 Countless numbers of homeowners failed to
identify the lender or beneficiary.246 Also, because they were in loan modification
discussions with their lender, some homeowners were under the misperception that they
did not have to submit to modification form.247 Second, there was no statewide oversight
over compliance with the 2009 law.248 Beneficiaries were merely required to file
compliance affidavits with the county records office.249 Furthermore, the information was
one-sided, showing only the beneficiary’s perspective of the mediation process and not
the homeowner’s viewpoint.250 Third, the 2009 amendment did not eliminate the risk of
dual track foreclosure and settlement; the foreclosure clock still ran even though a grantor
and beneficiary were in negotiations to modify their loan agreements, or if the grantor
was in a trial modification period and making trial payments.251
Oregon legislators hoped that Senate Bill 827 addressed the above problems by
proposing the following five amendments. First, modification forms needed to be
standardized.252 By standardizing the loan modification form, the legislators believed that
homeowners would more readily identify it in the enormous stack of papers that usually
accompanies foreclosure notifications.253 Further, it would more clearly alert
homeowners that they needed to fill out a modification form for participation in the
mediation program, even if verbal discussions of modification were in progress.254
Second, the new rules required borrowers to file a declaration with the county records
office that verified that they requested a loan modification and review in accordance with
state law and within the required timeline.255 Third, a beneficiary would be mandated to
send a copy of its compliance affidavit to the state’s Department of Justice upon filing
affidavits with the county’s recorder of deeds. Fourth, all beneficiary affidavits would be
amended and standardized as well. Finally, and most importantly, beneficiaries would not
be permitted to move forward with the foreclosure process until five days after they filed
the compliance affidavits.256 Thus, no public notice of the foreclosure would be possible
until day eighty-two under the new proposal.257 These new changes, if adopted, would
offer the broadest protections to homeowners and hopefully curtail the number of
foreclosures in Oregon.
Failure to comply with the proposed law would impede a lender’s ability to
commence a non-judicial foreclosure action of a principal residence mortgage if: 1) after
notice was mailed to the borrower, the housing counselor’s deadline to notify the
designated contact person of the borrower's modification request has not expired;258 2)
245

Id.
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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within fourteen days after the lender mailed the notice to the borrower, the borrower has
requested a meeting with the designated contact person and it has not been ninety days
after notice was mailed;259 3) the borrower had requested a meeting with the designated
contact person and provided necessary documents if requested, but the designated person
had not met or negotiated with the borrower;260 4) the borrower and mortgagee had
agreed in writing to modify the mortgage loan and the borrower was not in default under
the agreement;261 and 5) calculations under § 3205c (1) show that the mortgagor is
eligible for a loan modification, and non-judicial foreclosure is not allowed under
§ 3205c (7).262
Michigan. Michigan, one of the economies hardest hit by the modern recession,263
has tenaciously sought to slow the progression of foreclosure filings by enacting three
temporary laws in 2009: Public Acts 29, 30, and 31.264 Within fourteen days of receiving
notice of a foreclosure, a borrower must request a meeting with an approved housing
counselor.265 Upon doing so, the foreclosure sale may not commence until ninety days
after the notice is mailed.266
Under Public Act 29,267 a lender or its agent is halted from commencing a nonjudicial foreclosure of a principal residence mortgage if the foreclosing party failed to
mail the requisite notice to the borrower under Public Act 30 of 2009.268 The notice to
borrower must include, among other things, the name of the lender’s designated contact
authorized to settle with the borrower.269 Michigan’s Public Act 30 requires the
foreclosing party to notify the borrower of his rights within seven days after mailing a
notice of default/sale.270 The notice must be published once “in the same manner as is
required for publishing a notice of foreclosure sale.”271 The notice warns the borrower of
his or her ability to seek a loan modification.272 Should a borrower seek loan
modification, he or she is required to contact an approved housing counselor within

259

Id.
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
According to the 2010 U.S. Census, Michigan is the only state to have its population decline between
2000 and 2010. It is estimated that over the past ten years, Detroit has lost 25% of its residents. See Lauren
Knapp, Detroit’s Population Decline: 1 Person Departed Every 22 Minutes, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 23,
2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/03/-sarah-hulett-of-michigan.html.
264
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3205 (a), § 600.3205 (b), and § 600.3205 (c) repealed by MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.3205 (e) (West 2011). These new laws will only affect foreclosures on primary residence
mortgages started after July 5, 2009. These laws mimic the federal loan modification plan, the Making
Homes Affordable Program. Legislation and Policy, FORECLOSUREDETROIT.ORG,
http://www.foreclosuredetroit.org/pages/Legislation_Policy_Foreclosure_Detroit (last visited Apr. 8,
2012).
265
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3205 (a), § 600.3205(c) (West 2011).
266
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3205 (a)(1)(e).
267
2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 29.
268
2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 29 (a)–(h).
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2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 29.
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2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 30 (k)(4).
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Id. at (d)
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fourteen days after the list is mailed.273 Within ten days of being contacted by a borrower,
a housing counselor must contact a lender’s designated contact of a borrower’s decision
to modify.274 Upon being contacted by a housing counselor, a mortgage holder or its
servicer must determine the borrower’s modification or work out eligibility.275
Eventually, a housing counselor will schedule a meeting between the borrower and
lender.276 A housing counselor will attend the meeting only if the borrower specifically
requests it.277 The meeting(s) must “be held at a time and place that is convenient to all
parties, or in the county where the property is situated.”278
Public Act 31 “provides that if the meeting specified in Public Act 30 does not
result in an agreement to modify the mortgage loan, the lender/servicer or its agent shall,
with some exceptions, work with the borrower under Section 3205c to apply a loan
modification program” or other settlement that complies with relevant paragraphs of
§ 3205c.279 A lender may use the loan modification program to lower the “ratio of the
borrower's housing-related debt (including principal and interest, taxes, insurance and
association fees) to the borrower's gross income of 38% or less, on an aggregate basis.”280
The goal is to make mortgages more affordable. Public Act 31 outlines mortgagor
housing-related debt-reduction methods.281 If a lender improperly denies a mortgagor’s
loan modification request, then the lender will be forced to pursue judicial foreclosure
only.282
Washington. Creating an emergency law to reduce foreclosure action filings, the
State of Washington created the “Prevent or Reduce Owner-Occupied Foreclosure
Program.”283 Legislators created this program to help borrowers, who are actually in
foreclosure or on the verge of foreclosure, achieve “work-outs, loan modifications, or
other results that keep them in their homes.”284 This emergency law sunset on June 30,
2011.285
These state efforts, along with the federal government’s loan modification or loss
mitigation programs, have pulled thousands of families out of foreclosure.286
273
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2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 31 (1).
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Id.
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Id.
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2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 31.
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Id. at (1)(a)
281
Id. at (b). These methods include:
(i) An interest rate reduction, as needed, subject to a floor of 3%, for a fixed term of at least 5
years; (ii) An extension of the amortization period for the loan term, to 40 years or less from the
date of the loan modification; (iii) Deferral of some portion of the amount of the unpaid principal
balance of 20% or less, until maturity, refinancing of the loan, or sale of the property; (iv)
Reduction or elimination of late fees.
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Press Release, TheLendingEdge.com, Michigan Tries to Slow Foreclosures with New Laws, (June 18,
2009), available at http://www.free-press-release.com/news/200906/1245382343.html.
283
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.320.160 (West 2011).
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Id. at (1).
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See, e.g., Jocelyn Cockrum, National Foreclosure Rate Slows, Denver Rate Also Down, DENVER POST
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Unfortunately, though, the loan modification programs do not require lenders to actually
modify any loan agreements.287 The programs simply provide homeowners with an
opportunity to talk with mortgagees to possibly avoid foreclosure or modify their
loans.288 However, servicers or mortgagees have ignored requests for modification or
inconsistently applied modification standards.289 Thus, without penalties or good faith
requirements to encourage modification, millions of homeowners will still lose their
homes, prolonging the housing crisis and annihilating the national economy.
ii. Federal Loan Modification and Refinance Programs
a. Home Affordability Modification Program (HAMP)
HAMP, as a part of the Making Homes Affordable Program, was designed to
reduce delinquent and at-risk borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments.290 For qualified
borrowers, HAMP could reduce a borrower’s monthly payments to a more affordable
amount, no more than 31% of a borrower’s verified gross monthly income.291 Borrowers
apply for HAMP modifications by filling out and submitting an application to their
mortgage loan servicers.292 The request for modification is included in the standard
application.293
To be eligible for HAMP, a borrower must: a) occupy the mortgaged property as its
primary residence; b) have received its mortgage prior to January 1, 2009; c) have
mortgage payments that exceed 31% of its monthly gross income; d) owe no more than
$729,750 on the mortgaged property; e) be delinquent (or in danger of imminent
delinquency) in its mortgage payments; f) have documented and sufficient information
that supports sufficient income to make modified payments; and g) not have been
convicted, within the last ten years, of felony larceny, theft, fraud or forgery, money
laundering, or tax evasion, in connection with a mortgage or real estate transaction.294
HAMP has been essentially ineffective since its genesis295 and criticism of the program
has gained strength.296 In March 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives moved to cut
(Mar. 30, 2012), http://yourhub.denverpost.com/denver/national-foreclosure-rate-slows-denver-rate-alsodown/Uc9TEPOyg3xNmCzJqvMOcJ-ugc?hl. See generally Avoiding Foreclosure, supra note 140.
287
See Armour, supra note 170.
288
Id.
289
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-634, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: FURTHER
ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULLY AND EQUITABLY IMPLEMENT FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS 14
(2010).
290
Home Affordability Modification Program, supra note 177. The Obama Administration also created
programs similar to HAMP, such as Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative, FHA Loan Modification,
and Second Lien Modification Program. MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE,
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
291
Homeowner Modification Program, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE,
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/Pages/hamp.aspx (last visited Mar. 15,
2012).
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id.
295
Testimony of Thompson, supra note 32, at 3.
296
Jennifer Liberto, House Votes to Kill Obama Mortgage Plan, CNN MONEY (Mar. 29, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/03/29/news/economy/republicans_kill_hamp/index.htm.
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any new funding to the program by a vote of 252 to 170.297 Many legislators attacked the
program because “[m]ore homeowners have been kicked out of the program than have
received permanent relief.”298 Furthermore, failure to comply with HAMP does not give
homeowners a private right of action against mortgage loan servicers or the ability to
switch to a different servicer. As one legislator stated, “Homeowners cannot choose their
mortgage servicing, and lawsuits (outside of bankruptcy) to impose liability on servicers
for mistreatment of consumers have largely floundered, in part because the servicers
argue they have no contractual duty to the homeowners—only to the trusts or banks that
pay them.”299 Therefore, without uniform rules that create mortgage loan servicer
accountability and liability, HAMP will continue to fall short of its goals.300
b. Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP)
In 2009, the Obama Administration introduced HARP “to assist millions of
struggling home owners make their mortgage payments and hold on to their property.”301
While HAMP helps homeowners who are past due or in default,302 HARP provides a
remedy for homeowners who are “performing” on their home loans.303 Under HARP,
qualified homeowners, whose loans are guaranteed by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae, may
refinance their mortgages at lower interest rates.304
297

H.R. 839, 112th Cong. (2011).
Liberto, supra note 296 (quoting Representative Darrell Issa).
299
Andrew Martin, A Critic’s Take on the Mortgage Modification Program, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (June 10,
2011, 12:48 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/a-critics-take-on-the-mortgage-modificationprogram/ (quoting law professor Katherine Porter).
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See generally Lorraine Woellert, Anti-Foreclosure Program Shows Participation Gains, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/foreclosure-prevention-program-showsgains-amid-criticism.html (noting that HAMP has helped approximately 579,650 borrowers out of the
millions of foreclosure filings in 2010, short of its goal to help three to four million homeowners).
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Progress of the Making Home Affordable Program: What Are the Outcomes for Homeowners and What
Are the Obstacles to Success?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity and
U.S. H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. (2009) (written testimony of Dave Stevens, Asst. Sec’y
for Housing and Fed. Housing Auth. Comm’r for U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urb. Dev.), available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cir/test090909.cfm.
302
Home Affordable Refinance Program, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE,
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-rates/Pages/harp.aspx (last updated Jan. 6, 2012).
Similar refinance programs include Making Homes Affordability Program (MHAP), Mortgage Refinance
Program, Federal Mortgage Home Refinance Program, Bad Credit Mortgage Refinance, FHA Streamline
Refinance Program, Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue Plan, Refinance with Little Equity Plan, No Document
Mortgage Refinance Program, Mortgage Relief Plan, and Short Refinance Program. See, e.g., Explore
Programs, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/view-allprograms/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Mar. 29, 2012).
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Home Affordable Modification Program, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE,
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/Pages/hamp.aspx (last updated Apr. 25,
2012); Home Affordable Refinance Program, supra note 302.
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In addition to having mortgages guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, homeowners qualify for
HARP if: 1) the mortgage was sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac on or before May 31, 2009; 2) the
mortgage was not refinanced previously under HARP, unless it was a Fannie Mae loan refinanced under
HARP between March and May 2009; 3) the loan-to-value ratio is greater than 80%; 4) they are current on
their mortgage payments, with no late payments made in the past six months, and no more than one late
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The housing and mortgage crisis has devastated housing prices, eating up
homeowner equity.305 Homeowners may be unable to refinance their mortgage loans if
they have low or negative equity in their homes. That is, if their mortgage balance is
nearly equal to or exceeds the value of their homes, then traditional refinancing may be
unobtainable.306 Thus, without any assistance, homeowners may decide to “strategically
default,” even though they are current on their mortgages.307
It is reported that “more than 800,000 borrowers” have taken advantage of the
HARP refinancing program by refinancing their mortgages.308 However, this pales in
comparison to the estimated 4 million borrowers who “appear to meet the basic eligibility
for HARP refinancing.”309
Elizabeth Duke, a member of the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve
Board, believes that low HARP participation is due to other resistance or impediments to
refinancing.310 Duke suggests “four possible frictions” to HARP refinancing.311 First,
Duke believes that loan-level pricing adjustments (LLPA) may discourage homeowners
from participating in HARP.312 LLPAs may substantially raise refinancing costs, which
may deter some homeowners.313 Second, Duke suspects that participation levels are
likely related to “limited lender competition” for HARP refinancing.314 Duke opines that
lenders are cautious in adopting prior underwriting “putback” risks.315 Third, another
friction Duke credits for low participation in HARP is that junior lienholders refuse to
mortgages; and 6) they have the ability to make the refinanced loan payments. Frequently Asked Questions,
HOME AFFORDABLE REFINANCE PROGRAM, http://www.harpprogram.org/faq.php#5 (last visited Apr. 3,
2012).
305
Office of Policy Dev. & Research, U.S. Housing Market Conditions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., 3 (Aug. 2011),
http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/ushmc/summer11/USHMC_2q11_summary.pdf (noting a
decline rate in home values of 2.5% for existing homes during the first quarter of 2011 and a 5.5% decrease
from 2010).
306
See Tuttle, supra note 24.
307
Id. But see Jessica Silver-Greenberg, House Is Gone but Debt Lives On, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576572532029526792.html (reporting a surge
in the pursuit of deficiency judgments by lenders in general and mainly against borrowers who strategically
defaulted on their mortgages).
308
Duke, supra note 110.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
Id. “LLPAs are upfront fees that are added to the refinancing costs of loans that are judged to have
higher risk characteristics, such as high loan-to-value ratios.” Id.
313
Id.
314
Id.
315
Id. A mortgage “putback” means that the loan originator repurchases the mortgage from the entity
currently holding the security. See, e.g., Ash Bennington, Citi Could Face a $22 Billion Loss on Put-Back
Mortgage Bonds, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/39737924/Citi_Could_Face_A_22_Billion_Loss_On_Put_Back_Mortgage_Bonds
. An originator typically repurchases the mortgage upon fraud or misrepresentations of a mortgagor’s
creditworthiness or appraised value of the security. Id. According to Duke, under these circumstances,
“lenders who process HARP refinancings have putback risk both from the refinance and from the original
underwriting, even if the refinancing lender did not underwrite the original loan.” Duke, supra note 110.
Many lenders may be hesitant to refinance loans in which they took no part in the loan origination.
Consequently, many mortgagors are unable to participate in HARP, even though they may qualify. Id.
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subordinate to the new HARP refinanced loan.316 Fourth, mortgage insurers guarantee or
agree to take on any risk of default with a lender in making a loan.317 Duke suspects that
the final obstacle to HARP refinancing might be mortgage insurers’ refusal to reunderwrite their policies.318
Although it could help lower defaults and foreclosures by making mortgages more
affordable, HARP, like HAMP, has floundered, failing to make any noteworthy changes
for a majority of distressed homeowners. Perhaps more homeowners would participate if
the four impediments to HARP refinancing were removed.319 However, many queries
linger, including: 1) who may remove these obstacles to refinancing; and 2) how may
these impediments be removed.
In response to the criticism of Duke and others, the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA), with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, announced changes to HARP in
October 2011.320 The FHFA modified HARP in the following five ways. First, more
underwater debtors are now eligible for HARP refinancing because the FHFA removed
the 125% loan-to-value cap for fixed-rate mortgages backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac.321 Irrespective of a homeowner’s loan-to-value ratio, a borrower who meets
HARP’s other requirements may now qualify for HARP refinancing. Second, the FHFA
waived upfront loan-level fees for borrowers who refinance into shorter-term mortgages,
316

Duke, supra note 110. Generally, when a senior lienholder modifies its mortgage, it retains its priority
unless the modification increases the debt amount or interest rate. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 38,
at § 9.4. Modifications, as anticipated under HARP, could potentially benefit a junior lienholder. HARP
modifications could reduce the likelihood that a mortgagor will default, causing the senior lienholder to
foreclose and wipe out the junior lienholder’s security interest. Id. However, many junior lienholders might
be cautious of HARP refinancings and how it affects their priority status. Therefore, they may hold up a
homeowner’s refinancing process to investigate the effects. Duke, supra note 110 (stating that junior
lienholder can hold “up the HARP process” by refusing to “remain subordinate to a proposed new
refinance loan”).
317
MGIC’s Underwriting Guide, MORTGAGE GUARANTY INSURANCE CORP., 7–8 (2011),
http://www.mgic.com/pdfs/71-40600_uwguide.pdf. Before agreeing to underwrite a mortgage, a mortgage
insurer will usually thoroughly assess a mortgagor’s likelihood of default. Id. at 7. During the underwriting
process, a mortgage insurer will review: “the borrower’s willingness and ability to repay the loan”; “the
borrower’s commitment to the property”; “the housing and economic conditions in the property’s market;
the marketability of the property and justification of its value as documented in the appraisal or other
acceptable alternative; and the loan program (for example, ARM vs. fixed payment).” Id. Upon mortgagor
default, a lender, who paid a premium initially, suffers a loss and is paid by the mortgage insurer for the
loss. Id.
318
Duke, supra note 110. This refusal to re-underwrite is “despite presumably diminished default risk after
the refinancing.” Id. Though there are no reports on this issue, a mortgage insurer may hesitate to reunderwrite a mortgage because: 1) of the costs to the insurer, such as re-investment of time and resources to
evaluate the mortgagor’s background; 2) concerns related to a mortgagor’s ability to pay; or 3) trepidations
that the housing market has not yet bottomed out. As Duke pointed out, the risks of HARP refinancing only
presumably diminishes the risk of default, but does not guarantee it. Guaranteeing against default is, in fact,
a mortgage insurer’s responsibility. Mortgage insurers may not feel that the timing is yet ripe or prudent to
re-underwrite policies. Id.
319
Id.
320
News Release, Fed. Housing Finance Agency, FHFA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Announce HARP
Changes to Reach More Borrowers (Oct. 24, 2011), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/22721/HARP_release_102411_Final.pdf
321
Id.
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i.e., those less than twenty years, and lowered other borrower fees.322 Third, the FHFA no
longer mandates new property appraisals if a reliable Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
automated valuation model estimate exists.323 Fourth, to increase lender participation, the
FHFA waived certain lender representations and warranties liabilities related to making
original loans owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.324 Finally, for
mortgages originally sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac on or before May 31, 2009, the
FHFA extended the availability of HARP until December 31, 2013.325
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution
i. Mediation
Foreclosures not only result in losses to mortgagors, but can also burden a judicial
system with extraordinary influxes of foreclosure filings. To ease this burden, a few
jurisdictions have created mandatory or voluntary mediation programs. The below
programs are illustrative of some of the state alternative dispute resolution efforts
undertaken.
Connecticut. In Connecticut, the Chief Court Administrator created a residential
foreclosure mediation program for each state judicial district.326 The Connecticut
residential foreclosure mediation program was designed to “address all issues of
foreclosure, including, but not limited to, reinstatement of the mortgage, assignment of
law days, assignment of sale date, restructuring of the mortgage debt and foreclosure by
decree of sale.”327 Only court-specified mediators can conduct the mediation.328 Along
with their mediation duties, the mediators can refer participating mortgagors to
“community-based resources when appropriate” and other “mortgage assistance
programs.”329
Delaware. Delaware also created a court-based mediation program in 2008 in
response to an upturn in foreclosure filings.330 A group of lawyers (for mortgagors and
mortgagees), bankers, consumer advocates, and housing counselors worked to create a
foreclosure mediation program for Delaware courts.331 Under the mediation program, a
322

Id.
Id.
324
Id.
325
Id.
326
Notice Regarding the Foreclosure Mediation Program P.A. 09-209, STATE OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH,
http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/news/press270.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
327
Id.
328
Id.
329
Id. In June 2009, Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court created a mandatory foreclosure mediation program
modeled after Connecticut’s mediation program. 2009 Me. Laws ch. 402.
330
Press Release, Del. State Housing Auth., State Launches New Program to Help Homeowners Facing
Foreclosure (Sept. 10, 2009). The residential foreclosure mediation program
is limited to homeowners who own a one to four unit home and reside in the home as their primary
residence or reside in one of the units of a one to four unit home as their primary residence and the
mortgage on that property which is their primary residence is being foreclosed.
Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program, No. 2011-2, 2–3 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2011)
(admin. directive).
331
Del. State Housing Authority, supra note 330.
323
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plaintiff, upon initiating a foreclosure action, must notify the homeowner and send him a
“Special Notice Hotline Flyer, providing a hotline number . . . , a Universal Intake Form,
. . . and a Foreclosure Intervention Counseling Client’s Checklist . . . .”332 The Special
Notice Hotline Flyer will implore the mortgagor to contact a HUD-certified housing
counselor.333 The HUD counselor will then “provide the homeowner with information
pertaining to the Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Program.”334 Also, the flyer will
“encourage the homeowner” to stay in touch with the foreclosing party.335
Florida. Similarly, in Florida, a task force created and presented a model, uniform
mediation program to be implemented by each circuit chief judge.336 Under the Florida
mediation program, all residential homestead foreclosures are referred to mediation,
“unless the plaintiff and borrower agree otherwise or unless effective pre-suit mediation
that substantially complies” with the mediation program has already taken place.337 The
Florida Supreme Court adopted the recommendation “as the best method to open
communication and facilitate problem-solving between the parties to foreclosure cases
while conserving limited judicial resources.”338 Included within the mediation program is
the ability of the parties to opt out of mediation
if they participated in pre-suit mediation either directly through the
managed mediation program or through a Supreme Court-certified circuit
civil mediator specially trained to mediate residential mortgage
foreclosure actions, providing the borrower has participated in foreclosure
counseling, there has been a supervised exchange of plaintiff and borrower
disclosures, and mediation resulted in either settlement or impasse. In
order to qualify as an opt-out from the managed mediation program, presuit mediation must share characteristics of the managed mediation
program; that is, it must be independent, genuine, fair and impartial.339
Nevada. Nevada law gives mortgagors the option to choose mediation to
circumvent foreclosures by power of sale and modify their mortgages.340 In Nevada, a
mortgagor is given a form accompanied with an envelope addressed to the Mediation
Administrator if he or she chooses mediation or a waiver of mediation form if he or she
does not choose mediation.341 The Mediation Administrator then assigns the mediation to

332

Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program, supra note 330.
Id.
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
Final Report and Recommendations on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, No. AOSC09-54, (Fla.
Dec. 28, 2009) (admin. order). The mediation program “applies to all residential mortgage foreclosure
actions filed against homestead property involving loans that originated under federal truth in lending
regulations.” Id.
337
Id. Only the mediators who are specially trained in residential mortgage foreclosure matters will be
assigned to mediate cases under the uniform Florida mediation program. Id.
338
Id.
339
Id.
340
NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086 (2011).
341
§ 107.086 (2)(a)(3).
333
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a justice, judge, hearing master, or other designee for scheduling.342 A mortgagee may
not exercise its power of sale foreclosure until the completion of the mediation.343
Further, by dangling mediation as a prerequisite to exercising a power of sale foreclosure,
mortgagees are incentivized to attend mediation sessions, bring required documents to the
mediation, and, most importantly, participate in good faith. The court may impose a
sanction for the failure to do any of these actions.344 The sanctions may be whatever the
court deems appropriate, including requiring a loan modification.345
Rhode Island. Rhode Island legislators passed new legislation in 2009 that provides
for optional foreclosure counseling.346 When Rhode Island mortgagors receive a notice of
default, they are also informed of the right to seek foreclosure counseling by a HUDapproved mortgage counselor.347 If a mortgagee fails to provide a mortgagor the right to
foreclosure mediation, then a foreclosure sale may be deemed void.348 The new law does
not, however, instruct the parties on how to reach a conclusion or describe what happens
if the parties fail to reach an agreement.
Washington. Upon contacting a housing counselor, qualified Washington
mortgagors might be recommended for Washington’s Foreclosure Mediation Program.349
Explicitly stated in the law is the requirement that both the mortgagor and
beneficiary/trustee act in good faith.350 Failure to act in good faith will cause dire
consequences for either party. While the mortgagor may be unable to modify the terms of
the mortgage agreement, the beneficiary/trustee right to foreclose might be impaired.351
ii. Mandatory Settlement Conference
A few jurisdictions have attempted other remediation efforts, such as mandatory
settlement conferences. After noting a 150% increase in foreclosure filings from January
2006 to April 2008, all of the branches of government in New York individually
proposed loss mitigation strategies related to foreclosure.352 The New York judicial
system enacted an early court intervention action plan to deal with its high level of
foreclosures.353 In the executive branch, New York Governor David Patterson initiated an
interagency task force, “Halt Abusive Lending Transactions” (HALT), to stop predatory
lending practices and foreclosures in 2008.354
342

§ 107.086 (2)(b).
§ 107.086 (3).
344
§ 107.086 (5).
345
Id.
346
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-27-3.1 (b) (West 2011).
347
Id.
348
§ 34-27-3.1 (c).
349
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.0002 (West 2011) (entitled the “Foreclosure Fairness Act of 2011”).
350
§ 61.24.0002 (iv).
351
Id. For more information on foreclosure mediation and federal support, see Melanca Clark & Daniel
Olmos, Foreclosure Mediation: Emerging Research and Evaluation Practices, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
(2011).
352
Judith S. Kaye & Ann Pfau, Residential Mortgage Foreclosures: Promoting Early Court Intervention,
N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 2–4, (2008),
http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/ResidentialForeclosure6-08.pdf..
353
Id.
354
Press Release, Office of Governor David A. Patterson, Governor Patterson Announces Request for
343
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Finding the HALT report’s numbers unacceptable, the New York legislature
reformed its subprime lending legislation. Among other changes, the legislature amended
the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3408.355 For foreclosures involving
residential mortgages originated
between January 1, 2003 and September 1, 2008, or sub-prime, or nontraditional loan where the defendant [mortgagor] is a resident of the
property, the court must hold a voluntary conference within sixty (60)
days after the date proof of service of the foreclosure is filed with the
county court clerk, or on an adjourned date agreed to by the parties, if the
defendant-homeowner requests a conference.356
With this change, when lenders and borrowers begin negotiations for loan modification,
failure to act in good faith could have dire consequences for either party, but especially
lenders.
Along with the legislative and executive branches, New York courts also addressed
deficiencies in loan modification negotiations. In IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. YanoHoroski,357 the Supreme Court in Suffolk County, New York took a hardline stance
against a lender after it failed to “even find so much as a scintilla of good faith” on
lender’s behalf while negotiating a loan modification with a mortgagor.358 The mere
filing of a foreclosure action by a lender invokes the court’s equity jurisdiction.359 At that
juncture, the court must review the evidence on the whole to determine if equitable relief
for the lender will be permissible.360 If a lender’s conduct is “willful or unconscionable”
or “of such a nature that honest and fair minded folk would roundly denounce such
actions as being morally or ethically wrong,”361 then a court may decide to dismiss the
lender’s action, finding a lender is without recourse in a court of equity.362
The Yono-Horoski court found that the lender’s conduct was “greatly egregious and
so completely void of good faith that equity cannot be permitted to intervene on its
Proposal to Assist Homeowners Facing Foreclosure (June 16, 2008), available at
http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr080619a.htm. In a December 2008 report, the HALT task force found a
correlation between the type of mortgage and rate of delinquency and foreclosure. Id. The task force further
observed a definite link between the high level of delinquency and adjustable rate mortgages. Id. It
suggested that subprime adjustable rate mortgages were “the primary driver, with nearly one-third of such
loans listed as seriously delinquent during the third quarter of 2008.” Id.
355
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408 (McKinney 2009).
356
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (noting that the
legislature amended the statute in 2009 to expressly require lenders to negotiate settlements in good faith).
357
IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 313 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 2009). But see IndyMac
Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (App. Div. 2010) (reversing trial court's order
canceling mortgage and debt).
358
IndyMac Bank F.S.B., 890 N.Y.S.2d at 317 (taking notice that the lender rejected all of the mortgagor’s
reasonable settlement offers, including a modification of the interest rate, a short sale, and deed in lieu of
foreclosure).
359
Id. at 318.
360
Id. at 317.
361
Id. at 318.
362
Id. at 319 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Schwartz, 133 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) and York
v. Searles, 90 N.Y.S. 37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955), aff’d, 82 N.E. 1134 (N.Y. 1907)).
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behalf.”363 Moreover, the court held that the lender’s behavior was severe enough to
warrant monetary sanctions under title 22 of the New York Code, Rules and Regulations
§ 130-1.1 et seq.364 Thus, the court cancelled the mortgagor’s indebtedness, $292,500,
and set it aside, making the mortgage unenforceable.365 Additionally, the court cancelled
and discharged the mortgagee’s recorded mortgage.366 Consequently, neither the
lienholder nor its successors or assigns would be able to enforce the note or mortgage
against the mortgagor/debtor.367
Similarly, in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes,368 another New York case, a
lender sought to modify the mortgage agreement with an adjustable rate component.369
As a result, the Erie County Superior Court rejected the loan modification, announcing
that inclusion of an adjustable rate component flew “in the face” of CPLR § 3408 inter
alia.370 Moreover, the court found that Wells Fargo acted in bad faith and contrary to
CPLR § 3408 by proposing this modification.371 Thus, the court dismissed Wells Fargo’s
foreclosure action, without prejudice; it also noted that should the bank pursue another
action, no additional costs or attorney fees would be awarded absent good cause.372
Another case that illustrates New York courts’ disdain for subprime adjustable rate
mortgages is Emigrant Mortgage Co. v. Corcione.373 In Corcione, the Suffolk County
Supreme Court found that subprime adjustable rate mortgages are products of unequal
bargaining positions in virtually all circumstances, due to the customs and practices of the
mortgage lending industry.374 Due to unequal bargaining position and mortgagor’s
inability to freely negotiate a mortgage, the court viewed the mortgage at issue and its
documentation as a contract of adhesion, construing it against the mortgagee as the
drafter.375 In addition to limiting the lender’s ability to collect on interest for a certain
time period, legal fees, costs, etc., the Corcione court awarded the mortgagor exemplary
damages in the amount of $100,000, related to the lender’s “shockingly inequitable, bad
faith conduct.”376
E. Deferment
1. Delays
Attempting to provide time for lenders and borrowers to engage in settlement
discussions, a few jurisdictions permitted delays in foreclosures. In 2007, foreclosure and
363

Id.
Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1 (2011).
365
IndyMac Bank F.S.B., 890 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
366
Id.
367
Id. at 320.
368
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
369
Id. at 632.
370
Id. at 634.
371
Id.
372
Id.
373
Emigrant Mortgage Co. v. Corcione, 900 N.Y.S.2d 608, 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
374
Id. at 610.
375
Id.
376
Id. at 614.
364
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default rates in California markedly climbed.377 Lenders foreclosed on over 84,375
foreclosed properties; more than 250,000 properties were in default.378 In July 2008,
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed emergency foreclosure reform into law to
address the high number of foreclosures.379 Senate Bill 1137 required mortgagees,
trustees, beneficiaries or their authorized agents to wait thirty days before filing a notice
of default.380 During this time, lenders are directed to contact borrowers to evaluate
borrowers’ “financial situation[s]” and “explore options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure.”381 Though, at first glance, the law appears to help mortgagors avoid
foreclosure, it does not require lenders to engage in extensive discussions with the
mortgagors to modify the loan.382
In 2009, Colorado enacted House Bill 1276, which gave eligible borrowers a
ninety-day foreclosure deferment option.383 During the deferment period, a borrower was
obligated to seek financial counseling from an approved foreclosure counselor384 and
make partial note payments.385
Similar to modification programs, delays, as instituted in California and Colorado,
give mortgagors opportunities to explore settlement options before a foreclosure sale.
Further, they also allow mortgagors to become better educated concerning the foreclosure
process by seeking counseling with an approved foreclosure counselor. However, the
mandatory delay does not require a mortgagee or its servicer to settle; it just provides
time to settle.
2. Foreclosure Moratoria
i. During the Great Depression
Replicating the foreclosure moratoria models used during the Great Depression,
some state lawmakers have urged their own legislatures to adopt a mandatory foreclosure
moratorium. To date, they have been unsuccessful in lobbying the Obama Administration
377

U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 30. 2008),
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/us-foreclosure-activity-increases-75-percent-in-20073604 (reporting that California had the highest number of foreclosure filings and ranked among the top ten
in the nation for foreclosures in 2007).
378
S.B. 1137, ch. 69, § 1(a), 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
379
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (a)(1) (West 2011).
380
Id. This law applied to residential mortgage loans made between January 1, 2003 and December 31,
2007 for owner-occupied residences. California law imposed an additional delay of foreclosure that sunset
on Jan. 1, 2011. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.52 (West 2010), now repealed, which delayed the time before
a lender could give a borrower a notice of sale, under certain circumstances, for 90 days.
381
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (a)(1) (West 2011).
382
Mehta v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1193 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Mabry v. Super. Ct.
of Orange Cnty., 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 212 (N.D. Cal. 2010) and finding that the requirements of
§ 2923.5 are “very minimal” in that it does not “require the lender to modify the loan or do very much more
than have minimal conversations with the debtor to assess their position and inform them of various options
to avoid foreclosure.”).
383
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-38-803 et seq. (West 2011).
384
§ 38-38-803 (2).
385
§ 38-38-805 (2)(a) (stating that lenders are required to pay 66.67% of monthly payments to holder’s
designated receiver).
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for the imposition of a nationwide foreclosure moratorium.386 The proponents of
foreclosure moratoria believe that this drastic step is imperative to impede the housing
and mortgage markets from further collapse.
During the Great Depression, a record number of homeowners faced foreclosure.387
It was reported that foreclosures swelled from 134,900 to 252,400 from 1929 through
1933.388 According to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, banks foreclosed on
approximately 1000 mortgages per day.389 By the beginning of 1934, many homeowners
were being foreclosed upon, and many more—an estimated 50% of all urban
homeowners—were delinquent and in danger of foreclosure.390 Due to the historic
foreclosure and housing crisis, states attempted resolution by “encouraging lenders and
borrowers to renegotiate loan terms through mediation boards and other voluntary
arrangements.”391 Many promoted foreclosure moratoria when foreclosure numbers
increased further.392
On February 8, 1933, Iowa became the first state to impose a foreclosure
moratorium.393 Iowa courts granted a homeowner’s request for deferment of a foreclosure
action unless the lender could show good cause for not granting such relief.394 Twenty-six
other states soon followed, enacting legislation to substantially delay or halt mortgage
foreclosures.395 In New York, all foreclosure actions due to payment of principal default
were halted until after July 1, 1937.396 Similarly, an Arizona statute specified that in
current or future mortgage foreclosure actions, a “court may order a two-year
continuance unless good cause to the contrary is shown.”397
Minnesota became the second state to enact a statute that postponed foreclosure
sales for two years.398 The Minnesota statute also extended post-sale redemption periods
for mortgagors.399 If the court imposed a moratorium, then the court could mandate that
the debtor pay fair rental value or a portion of income received from the property.400
A mortgagee challenged the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute in Home
Building Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell.401 In Blaisdell, the mortgagors applied for an extension
386

See H.R. 344, 112th Cong. (2011).
David C. Wheelock, Changing the Rules: State Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria During the Great
Depression, 90 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 569, 570 (2008), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/11/Wheelock.pdf.
388
Id.
389
Id.
390
Id.
391
Id. at 573.
392
Id. at 570.
393
Id. at 573.
394
Id.
395
In addition to Iowa, states enacting foreclosure moratoria were Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See id.
396
Id. at 574.
397
Id.
398
Minnesota Foreclosure Moratorium Law of 1933, 1933 Minn. Laws ch. 339.
399
Id.
400
Id.
401
Home Bldg. Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
387
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of their redemption period under the Minnesota Foreclosure Moratorium Law.402 The
mortgagee attacked the law as violating the Contracts Clause, Equal Protection, and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.403
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota Foreclosure Moratorium Law on
four grounds. First, the Court found that an economic emergency existed for the state.404
Second, the Court opined that the law addressed legitimate state ends in that the law was
“not for the mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a basic
interest of society.”405 Third, the statutory relief was appropriate when compared to the
nature of the emergency.406 Fourth, the Court believed that the legislation was justified,
temporary in operation, and limited to the “exigency which called it forth.”407 Therefore,
the Court held, the statute was constitutional and did not violate the powers afforded to a
state to address emergency crises.408
ii. Modern State and Federal Foreclosure Moratoria Movement
Once more, the nation faced widespread foreclosure actions. However, the lessons
from the past were not heeded. Following the 2009–2010 robo-signing scandal, a number
of states again endorsed either substantial delays or complete moratoria of mortgage
foreclosures.409 The following states demonstrate how moratoria take form.
Iowa. Iowa’s 1937 statute still remains effective, authorizing a court to halt a
foreclosure under certain circumstances.410 According to the statute, a homeowner in “all
actions for the foreclosure of real estate mortgages, deeds of trust of real property, and
contracts for the purchase of real estate” may request a stay upon filing an answer that
admits at least some of the indebtedness and breach, if the homeowner’s default or
inability to pay or perform is “mainly due or brought about by reason of drought, flood,
heat, hail, storm, or other climatic conditions or by reason of the infestation of pests
which affect the land in controversy.”411 Additionally, a homeowner may petition for a
moratorium if the governor declared “a state of economic emergency.”412
Hawaii. Hawaii lawmakers introduced thirty-two pieces of legislation related to
foreclosures in 2011.413 On May 5, 2011, the governor of Hawaii signed into law a key
piece of legislation, Senate Bill 651.414 Senate Bill 651 imposes an absolute moratorium
402
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on all new non-judicial foreclosures on owner-occupied residences through July 1,
2012.415 The bill allows homeowners an opportunity to meet with lenders to negotiate a
foreclosure avoidance agreement or mitigate losses associated with the avoidable
foreclosure.416 The new law also requires mortgagees, at mortgagor’s election, to
participate in the Mortgage Foreclosure Dispute Resolution Program (MFDRP) before
mortgagee may conduct any public sale.417
Senate Bill 651 thoroughly outlines how to participate in Hawaii’s MFDRP. For
instance, when providing foreclosure notice, mortgagees must notify mortgagors of the
right to participate in the MFDRP, using no less than a fourteen-point font.418 The notice
must also include a list of approved housing or budget counselors with whom the
mortgagor must consult at least thirty days before the first day of a scheduled dispute
resolution session.419 Furthermore, within three days of filing its foreclosure action, a
mortgagee must pay to Hawaii’s Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs a $250
filing fee, which goes into a mortgage dispute resolution special fund.420 Likewise, a
mortgagor pays the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs a $300 fee upon
electing to MFDRP.421 In addition to the fee, the application includes a statement that the
mortgagor is an owner-occupant.422 During the mediation period, all non-judicial
foreclosures are stayed.423 Any failure, on behalf of the mortgagee, to act in compliance
with the requirements of the MFDRP, constitutes a violation of the state’s unfair and
deceptive trade practices act.424 If a mortgagor chooses to participate in the MFDRP, then
a mortgagee will have tremendous incentive to act in good faith: a potential treble
damages award.425 Thus, the penalty for noncompliance is quite substantial.
Illinois. The courts and attorney general in Illinois also reviewed their state’s
foreclosure procedures.426 Courts there formed a mortgage fairness committee “to review
lending and foreclosure procedures in the state.”427 The committee’s main focus is to
examine the foreclosure process, thereby making it slower and tougher by amending a
lender’s prerequisites for foreclosure.428
South Carolina. In May 2011, Chief Justice Jean Toal of the South Carolina
Supreme Court instituted a mandatory foreclosure intervention program, which, in
415
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essence, stayed all pending foreclosure action in South Carolina.429 This was Chief
Justice Toal’s second administrative order related to foreclosure since the start of 2009.
The court’s first administrative order was in May 2009.430 The 2009 order was based on
the creation of HAMP.431 However, because of HAMP’s ineffectiveness, Chief Justice
Toal noted that the number of foreclosure actions actually increased since 2009.432
Further, South Carolina trial courts were overly burdened because of HAMP’s inability to
set the stage for actual loss mitigation, thereby increasing the number of foreclosure
filings.433 Therefore, a stay of foreclosure actions was critical for two reasons: 1) societal
benefits, helping debtors avoid foreclosure and homelessness, and 2) judicial economy.
The goal behind the 2011 administrative order is two-fold. First, a stay of all
pending foreclosure actions will afford eligible debtor-mortgagors and lender-servicers
the opportunity to modify their loan agreement under the revised HAMP standards.434
The stay also permits some state uniformity in how foreclosure actions are handled “so
that mortgage foreclosure actions are not unnecessarily dismissed, delayed or
inappropriately concluded while loan modification or other loss mitigation efforts are
being pursued.”435 Second, a stay of foreclosure actions will lessen the burden on court
resources.436
Federal. Advocating a temporary national moratorium on residential mortgages,
Representative Marcy Kaptur submitted a resolution on July 8, 2011, which is currently
before the U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on Financial Services.437 Kaptur
stated that a national foreclosure moratorium is justified because: 1) unemployment rates
remain high at a rate of nine percent;438 2) housing sales remain poor;439 3) construction
activities are scant;440 and 4) the excess number of vacant homes remains constant, which
lowers home values and makes the value of homes less than any outstanding mortgage
balance.441 Consequently, upside-down mortgagors are more likely to become delinquent,
which could further increase the number of foreclosures.442
It is highly unlikely that the Obama Administration will adopt the proposed
resolution because it previously rebuffed earlier pressures for a national foreclosure
moratorium. In October 2010, despite lobbying by many legislators and consumer
advocacy groups, the Obama Administration rejected a proposal for a national
429
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foreclosure moratorium.443 The Administration denounced the national moratorium
because it believed that the negative consequences to the national economy of mandatory
foreclosure stays outweighed any benefits to homeowners.444
iii. The Pros and Cons of Foreclosure Moratoria
The Administration’s conclusion is consistent with what historical moratoria have
illustrated. As the Obama Administration suggested, foreclosure moratoria have
advantages and disadvantages. An advantage, according to one economist, is that it
would “provide all market participants with more time to assess asset prices and evaluate
alternatives.”445 In other words, it gives the relevant parties—mortgagors, mortgagees, or
servicers—the opportunity to sit down and discuss their state of affairs and find solutions.
Because a hefty percentage of defaults and subsequent foreclosures are due to adjusted
interest rates after the expiration of the introductory rate period, a foreclosure moratorium
would permit homeowners to adjust their personal finances accordingly.446 Further,
lenders, builders, and other sellers will be able to determine house prices and make
decisions on whether to lower home prices, build homes, modify loan agreements, or sell
under the current conditions.447
On the other hand, however, a disadvantage might include a prolonged down
market for the housing industry. In a housing crisis, there is an overabundance of
inventory, which in turn causes housing prices to further decline.448 If a state imposed a
foreclosure moratorium, then that state may “delay the ability of markets to clear excess
inventories,” which would arguably “restore [its] financial stability.”449
While some homeowners (and farmers) were able to save their properties from
foreclosure during the stay in the Depression, the costs of the moratorium were passed on
to prospective mortgagors.450 After the moratoria, lenders changed their lending rules,
making loans more difficult to obtain. 451 Prospective mortgagors paid higher costs for
any mortgages received or had to put up more security for loans than previous
mortgagors due to the lenders’ changes. 452 Thus, prospective mortgagors ultimately paid
a penalty for harsh market conditions not related to or created by their actions.
Although moratoria relief seemed like a tremendous help for homeowners in
foreclosure or on the verge of foreclosure, it rarely was. On one hand, foreclosure
moratoria had a societal benefit in that they curbed widespread homelessness.453 On the
other hand, however, there was no uniformity on how courts applied the remedy either
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within a jurisdiction or from state to state during the Great Depression.454 As one author
stated:
Many courts determined that it was pointless to grant relief to borrowers
who had no hope of refinancing their mortgage or making payments or
who did not act in good faith toward their lender. In addition, courts often
required borrowers to pay rent or interest to the lender, as well as taxes, as
a condition for halting foreclosure proceedings.455
Historical mortgage foreclosure moratoria caused loans to be more expensive and
hard to procure.456 The inability to foreclose on their securities and receive deficiency
judgments made lenders raise interest rates, tighten lending criterion and increase
collateral requirements for their loans.457 As recognized in a 1936 Central Housing
Committee Report, a statute with “lengthy, expensive, complicated or otherwise
burdensome foreclosure procedure,” or long redemption periods before a mortgagee can
realize its debt, caused mortgagees to raise costs.458 According to the report, “prospective
lenders naturally take into account the procedure available for realizing the debt out of
the security when determining the conditions on which they will be willing to make
loans.”459
Another disadvantage of mortgage foreclosure moratoria is that they affect all
mortgage servicers, both good and bad. So, both bad and proper acting lenders would
equally be subject to a moratorium. Also, some courts may apply the rules for moratoria
inconsistently as courts did during the 1930s.460 Further, state-imposed foreclosure
moratoria have not adequately solved all of the problems related to a mortgage or housing
crisis historically. Although homeowners found some relief in no longer facing
foreclosure, others who entered the housing market later “saw higher costs of credit and
fewer loans compared with states” that did not impose moratoria.461
When a government interferes by piercing the mortgagee-mortgagor contractual
relationship and creating a new mortgage agreement that disregards the consequence of
default—foreclosure—the cost of future mortgages increases.462 Given a lender’s likely
consternation that it will have losses if unable to foreclose, it is reasonable to increase
costs or tighten credit requirements.463 Thus, before a consumer enters onto the mortgage
financing field, he or she may be more disadvantaged and foreclosed out of the housing
market.
Moreover, foreclosure moratoria may only prolong the inevitable—borrower home
loss—because a mortgagor may be unable to pay and that fact would not likely change at
454
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the expiration of the moratorium. This is especially true if the borrower is unable to repay
the mortgage due to job loss or income shortages. Consequently, then, the outcome would
be the same regardless of a moratorium.
During the Great Depression, the federal government did not impose a national
foreclosure moratorium. Only states did. The federal government responded to the
economic crisis by establishing new federal agencies to handle refinancing of defaulted
mortgages and to “insure, and finance new mortgages.”464 The federal government’s
response to the modern market collapse is to create new federal agencies once again.465
However, some states have sought other mitigation measures.
3. The Dodd-Frank Act
Acknowledging that restructuring must take place on the front-end, i.e., during the
loan origination, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) into law on July 21, 2010.466 Dodd-Frank
launched sweeping financial reforms in multiple areas. Under Title XIV of Dodd-Frank,
the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, also known as the Truth-inLending Act (TILA),467 is amended. Dodd-Frank modifies TILA by setting forth prudent
lending standards, consumer protections for both prime and subprime (high cost)
mortgages, mortgage servicing guidelines, appraisal requirements, and loan
modification/work-out procedures. The Act makes lenders accountable for their lending
practices and seeks to protect consumers and stabilize the entire national economy,
including the real estate market.
Pertaining to the prudent loan extension criteria, TILA was amended in six ways.
First, mortgage originators are prohibited from advancing residential mortgages that a
“consumer lacks a reasonable ability to repay” or “has predatory characteristics or effects
(such as equity stripping, excessive fees or abusive terms).”468 Second, new regulations
prohibit mortgage originators from promoting a mortgage that is not qualified under
§ 129C (b)(2) to consumers who meet the standards for qualified mortgages.469 Third,
Dodd-Frank specifically bans abusive or unfair lending practices that result in disparate
extensions of credit among consumers based on race, ethnicity, gender, or age.470 Fourth,
lenders may not mischaracterize "the credit history of a consumer or the residential loans
available to a consumer."471 Fifth, lenders are prohibited from improperly portraying the
appraised value of the property securing the loan.472 Sixth, a lender is barred from
offering a mortgage if the mortgage originator is “unable to suggest, offer, or recommend
to a consumer a loan that is not more expensive than a loan for which the consumer
464
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qualifies, discouraging a consumer from seeking a residential mortgage loan secured by a
consumer’s principal dwelling from another mortgage originator.”473
Each of Dodd-Frank’s prohibitions should result in more widespread consumer
protection. Under §129B, creditors must make a “reasonable and good faith
determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is
consummated,” that the “consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan . . . ,” and
costs associated with the mortgage, such as, taxes, insurance (guarantee insurance) and
assessments.474 Lenders must base their “reasonable and good faith determination” on a
consumer’s ability to pay based on “credit history, current income, expected income the
consumer is reasonably assured of receiving, current obligations, [and] debt-to-income
ratio . . . .”475 Failure to comply with regulations will result in penalties. Consumers are
either entitled to amounts that do not exceed a consumer’s actual damages, or an amount
equal to three times the total amount of direct and indirect compensation or gain the
mortgage originator received in relation to the loan, plus costs and reasonable attorneys’
fees.476
Mortgage servicers must follow specific guidelines under the Dodd-Frank Act.
First, for verifying a consumer’s income, a lender is obligated to review a consumer’s
“W-2 [forms], tax returns, payroll receipts, financial institutional records, or other thirdparty documents that provide reasonably reliable evidence of the consumer’s income or
assets . . . .”477 Second, residential loans that are not “qualified mortgages” may not
contain terms for prepayment penalties for paying all or part of the principal after a loan
is consummated.478 “Qualified mortgages,” under Dodd-Frank, may not include: 1)
adjustable interest rates;479 or 2) annual percentage rates that exceed the average prime
rate for a comparable transaction.480 Third, if a state has consumer anti-deficiency
protections, then a creditor must “provide a written notice to [a] consumer describing the
protection provided by the anti-deficiency law” and significance of the loss of protection
before a loan is consummated.481 Further, if a consumer is seeking refinancing, which
may cause loss of anti-deficiency protection, the lender must “provide a written notice to
the consumer describing the protection provided by the anti-deficiency law[s]” and
significance of the loss of protection before the refinance is consummated.482 Finally,
disclosures in monthly statements for residential mortgages are discussed in full detail in
§ 1420 of the Act.483
Dodd-Frank also transforms the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)484
and mortgage servicing procedures. In relation to mortgage servicing procedures, Dodd473
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Frank first demands that before the consumer credit transaction is consummated,
creditors set up an escrow or impound account in a federally insured depository
institution “for the payment of taxes and hazard insurance, and, if applicable, flood
insurance, mortgage insurance, ground rents, and any other required periodic payments or
premiums with respect to the property or the loan terms . . . .”485 Creditors are only
mandated to take these measures if the consumer credit transaction is “secured by a first
lien on the principal dwelling of the consumer.”486
A creditor may be exempt from establishing an escrow or impound account under
certain circumstances by regulation.487 For instance, the regulating board may waive the
escrow or impound account requirement if the creditor operates “predominantly in rural
or underserved areas.”488 Additionally, if a creditor and all of its affiliates has a total
annual mortgage loan origination that do not exceed a particular set limit, it may not be
required to set up an escrow or impound account.489
A creditor must maintain the required escrow account for at least five years,
beginning with the credit consummation date,490 unless and until: 1) a debtor has
established “sufficient equity in the dwelling securing the consumer credit transaction so
as to no longer be required”;491 2) a debtor “is delinquent”;492 3) a debtor is in
noncompliance;493 or 4) the terms of the mortgage, which established the account, are
terminated.494
Dodd-Frank revises RESPA by inserting additional new servicer prohibitions.
Under the new revisions, servicers of federally related mortgages are prohibited from: 1)
obtaining force-placed hazard insurance unless there is a reasonable belief that a debtor
has breached its contractual obligation to maintain property insurance;495 2) charging fees
when responding to a debtor’s valid written request under RESPA;496 3) failing to timely
respond to a debtor’s request to correct errors of payment allocation, final balances
relating to payoff, foreclosure avoidance, or a servicer’s other standard duties;497 4)
failing to timely respond to a debtor’s request for information pertaining to its creditor’s
identity, address, or other relevant contact information;498 or 5) failing to comply with the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’s obligations.499 Additionally, Dodd-Frank
485
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increases the penalty amounts for noncompliance of RESPA.500
To counterbalance issues related to inflated appraisal values, Dodd-Frank
establishes new appraisal requirements for lower, moderate and higher risk mortgages; it
also amends TILA by inserting a new section, 129H.501 For an extension of credit for
higher-risk mortgages, a creditor must first obtain a written appraisal of the property by a
certified or licensed appraiser.502 The certified or licensed appraiser must conduct a
physical inspection of the mortgaged property’s interior to satisfy the new appraisal
requirements.503 A second appraisal may be required for higher risk mortgages under
certain circumstances.504 In connection to any appraisal made for the extension of higherrisk mortgage loans, a creditor must provide a free copy of each appraisal conducted
within at least three days prior to the transaction closing date.505 All appraisals must be
independent as described under § 129E. Willful noncompliance of the appraisal
prerequisites by the creditor results in a fine of $2000.506
One of the most important developments from Dodd-Frank is the genesis of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The CFPB’s core duty is to protect
consumers through enforcing federal consumer financial laws.507 In carrying out its
duties, the CFPB may draft rules and regulations for all mortgage-related businesses and
for bank and credit unions with assets of greater than $10 billion.508 The CFPB may also:
a) supervise and enforce federal consumer financial protection laws; b) address unfair,
deceptive, and abusive practices or acts; c) receive consumer complaints; d) sponsor
financial education for consumers; e) research consumer behavior; f) scrutinize financial
markets for the latest consumer financial risks; g) reduce outdated, unnecessary, and
overly burdensome regulations; and h) enforce antidiscrimination and other unfair
treatment in consumer finance.509
The CFPB offers a “single point of accountability” for financial institutions.510
Having one enforcer could potentially eliminate inconsistent and duplicative regulations.
It could also provide consumers with consistent response times and information. Further,
500
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the CFPB recognizes that consumer education is crucial.511 Thus, it has begun to educate
consumers from student-level onward. To reduce the risk of partisanship, the CFPB is led
by an independent director, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.512
Dodd-Frank is not without its criticism. Dodd-Frank requires securitizers and
originators to retain some of the risk, approximately 5%, of the mortgages sold to
investors on the secondary mortgage market.513 Opponents of this provision of DoddFrank believe that it could impede instead of facilitate the housing market recovery.514
The concern is that lenders would make it virtually impossible for debtors to obtain
consumer loans.515 Of course, mortgage bankers, bank lobbyists, and some Senate
Republicans criticize Dodd-Frank as being overly burdensome on mortgagees.516
VI. CONCLUSION
The housing market meltdown has exposed systemic problems with mortgage
financing and foreclosure structures. As scholars previously argued, the mortgage
financing system has racial and class biases.517 For example, racial minorities and the
poor were more likely to receive subprime or high cost mortgages. Similarly, a large
amount of these subprime mortgages were adjustable rate mortgages with short teaser
periods. As a result, these borrowers were forced out of their homes and into foreclosure
when the mortgage adjusted to a rate beyond their affordability. The prolonged housing
and foreclosure market crises reveal endemic shortcomings in the banking regulatory
511
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scheme. 518
While in foreclosure, the predatory conduct by lenders or their agents continued.
Some lenders refused to negotiate, in good faith, a loan modification or other settlement
to prevent foreclosure. Also, some lenders wrongfully foreclosed where mortgagors were
in compliance with the terms of their loan agreement. Additionally, foreclosures
proceeded despite documentation errors or failure to prove that the foreclosing party had
standing to do so. Thus, there were nationwide defects in the foreclosure system,
irrespective of a jurisdiction’s type of foreclosing method.
History shows that blanket mortgage foreclosure moratoria do not work. In fact,
generic moratoria may actually cause more harm than good in terms of prolonging the
housing crisis.519 All in all, crises reveal “chinks in the armor” in the foreclosure process.
Upon such revelation, jurisdictions can cautiously reform foreclosure processes and,
hopefully in turn, halt the housing market and national economic crises. But recently,
states, lenders, and the federal government have struggled to fix the problems, creating
only a patchy resolution.
Even though they have clashing interests at times, it is fundamental that the
relevant multiple actors play a role in determining these changes. The federal government
must continue to act to correct the inadequacies of the current foreclosure system due to
its implications on the national economy, either through legislation or regulation.
Consumers must play a role so in educating themselves on how to protect their interests
and avoid delinquencies and defaults. Lenders also need to play a role in the process
because they are responsible for ensuring compliance with the new rules. All of these
parties are necessary to create a healthy lending system, uniform servicing policies,
foreclosure process, and, thus, a stable real estate market.
There is no magic bullet to prevent default, even under the most conservative
underwriting standards. Circumstances change throughout the life of a mortgage that may
make default and foreclosure unavoidable. However, regulations are needed to obstruct
the creation of mortgage loans that are highly likely to result in default by using prudent
underwriting standards. Laws like Dodd-Frank are commendable in that they provide
extensive protections for consumers who are in default. However, they are also
lamentable in that they “throw the baby out with the bath water.” These laws regulate
lender behavior so stringently that lenders restrict their liability by limiting loan
availability, thereby injuring future debtors. Striking the right balance, whatever that
looks like, may require years of research and should not be reactionary.
Determining the perfect harmony between consumer protection and lender
accountability is very difficult. This is especially true if there are too many parties
working on the solution at varying times. Economic crises typically trigger reformation.
Therefore, the current economic crisis will, undoubtedly, spark unknown changes to the
518

Katherine Porter, a visiting professor at Harvard Law School, stated that the mortgage foreclosure crisis
“cries out for a national regulatory response, these problems are systemic.” See Christine Harper,
Foreclosure Crisis Needs Federal Response Harvard’s Porter Says, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-13/foreclosure-crisis-needs-federal-response-harvard-s-portersays.html.
519
See, e.g., Wheelock, supra note 387. This Article does not advocate blanket moratoria, but
acknowledges that moratoria or delay under the right circumstances, such as history of foreclosure process
abuses, might be warranted.
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lending and foreclosure landscape. Hopefully, however, these changes will produce
healthier lending and mortgage markets for consumers and lenders.
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